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SPORTS AGENTS: ETHICAL REPRESENTATIVES OR
OVERLY AGGRESSIVE ADVERSARIES?
STACEY B. EvANs*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Of particular importance in individual negotiations between
agents and clubs are three aspects of bargaining. The first is bar-
gaining in which the agent is seeking as large an economic reward
for the player's services as possible. The more the agent receives for
the player the less is left over for the club. In contrast is a second
aspect of bargaining in which the negotiators engage in joint prob-
lem solving to come up with solutions that benefit both sides. A
third aspect of individual contract negotiation is structuring the
bargaining environment or ambiance so as to smooth the path
toward agreement. "I
A. Definition and Qualifications of a Sports Agent
Though sports agents can, and often do, perform almost every
service for their clients, most "sports agent" definitions focus only
on the bare-bones agent responsibilities. Degree Directory defines
a sports agent as someone who "handles contract negotiations, pub-
lic relations issues and finances, and he or she will often procure
additional sources of income for the athlete (such as endorse-
ments)." 2 These definitions do not reflect the extent to which ath-
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1. Paul D. Staudohar, So You Want to Be a Sports Agent, 57 LAB. L.J. 4, 251
(2006) available at http://www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/employee-bene-
fits-benefits/4063876-1.html.
2. Degree Directory, Sports Agent: Career Definition, Occupational Outlook,
and Education Prerequisites, http://degreedirectory.org/articles/SportsAgent-
CareerDefini-tionOccupationalOutlook-andEducationPrerequisites.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
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letes often become dependent on their agents or that the agents
become deeply entrenched in their clients' personal lives. For ex-
ample, clients may look to their agent for guidance in personal bus-
iness matters, such as how to invest their money and make other
financial decisions.3 Similarly, most sports agents definitions do
not indicate the vast skill base that agents must possess in order to
effectively represent their clients. Though there are many impor-
tant agenting skills, knowing how to effectively negotiate is perhaps
the most important skill that a sports agent can possess. 4 Negotiat-
ing a good contract directly affects an agents' salary, because an
agent receives a commission that is usually based on between two
and five percent of the contract and with additional percentage for
any endorsement contracts.5
Many sports agents have a legal background, enabling them to
competently navigate complex contract provisions. It could be ar-
gued that attorney-agents receive valuable training in law school
that non-attorney agents never learn, including ethical training.
For this reason, many argue that an attorney-agent is more benefi-
cial to a client than a non-attorney-agent. 6 Yet, clients still channel
their inner Rod Tidwell, yelling, "Show me the money!" regardless
of the agents' skill set.7 This paper advocates that these arguably
shortsighted athletes need to pay more attention to the educational
backgrounds of their agents and less attention to the almighty
dollar.
3. See Tiger Woods Foundation, Career Exploration: Sports Agent, http://
www.tigerwoodsfoundation.org/file/Sports-Agent.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009)
("[A]gents often assist their clients in planning their spending and investments.
Agents know that clients thrive at work when their personal lives are secure, so
good agents offer financial guidance based on lessons they've learned watching
other pro players.").
4. See Marc D. Schneider, The Sports Agent in the 90's: A Behind the $cenes Look,
http://www.esportsinstruction.com/derrickfox2.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009)
("Derrick Fox, an agent with... Ultimate Sports Associates .... feels that the art of
negotiation can be broken down into three categories: acquisition of information,
power established with the: information, and defining time restraints.").
5. See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE AND TIMOTHY DAVIs, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS
AGENTS 5 (University of Pennsylvania Press 2d ed. 2008) ("The self-interest of
sports agents is the right to receive approximately 2 to 5 percent of multimillion-
dollar athlete contracts coupled with up to 30 percent of multimillion-dollar en-
dorsement deals.").
6. See Stacey M. Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by a Lawyer-Repre-
sentative than an Agent? Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 431, 440 (1999)
(arguing that attorneys are better suited to represent athletes than non-attorney
agents because attorneys unlike non-attorneys are held to Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct).
7. JERRY MAGUIRE (Gracie Films 1996) (quoting Rod Tidwell, played by Cuba
Gooding, Jr.).
[Vol. 17: p. 91
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SURVEY: SPORTS AGENTS AS REPRESENTATIVES
Athletes should take note that attorneys are trained in con-
tracts, negotiation, anti-trust, and agency law.8 This set of skills and
additional education allows an agent to help his or her client obtain
the best possible contract. Moreover, a player can rest easy know-
ing that an attorney-agent is held to a strict code of ethics and may
face severe penalties if he or she is found to act unethically or ille-
gally.9 Unfortunately, players are often swayed by agents who claim
they can obtain the most lucrative deal for a client rather than pay-
ing attention to who is the most qualified to negotiate.1 0
This article will analyze the ever-expanding role of agents in
professional sports. It will then touch upon the ethical issues plagu-
ing today's sports agents and compare the different styles of con-
tract negotiation. Examination of these various negotiation styles
will show that stricter ethical regulation in sports would benefit
agents, players and leagues alike, and that often the most successful
sports agents/negotiators are those who work collaboratively. Fur-
thermore, though attorney-agents are no more or less likely to work
collaboratively than non-attorney agents, this paper argues that hav-
ing a broader skill set makes collaboration and negotiating easier.
Although there may be many attributes that can comprise the ideal
agent or negotiating tactic, athletes would be wise to educate them-
selves about their agent options.'"
B. Public Opinion of Sports Agents and
Sports Agents' Regulation
The term "sports agent" often brings about images of sleazy,
money hungry individuals.1 2 Many people perceive agents as "ser-
pents..., poised to strike at the wealth professional athletes earn in
such plenty."' 3  Former Chicago Bears General Manager Jerry
8. See Stacey M. Nahrwold, supra note 6, at 451 (listing courses typically taken
by attorney-agents in law school).
9. See Melissa Steedle Bogad, Maybe Jeny Maguire Should Have Stuck with Law
School: How the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act Implements Lawyer-Like Rules for
Sports Agents, 27 CARozo L. REv. 1889, 1893 (2006) (indicating that attorneys are
subject to ethical codes and that violations can lead to sanctions).
10. See Staudohar, supra note 1, at 251 (identifying fickle nature and money-
driven attitude of athletes).
11. See Robert H. Ruxin, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO AGENTS 30-35 (The Stephen
Greene Press 2d. ed. 1989) (1982) (listing criteria that should be considered when
choosing agents and highlighting importance of careful agent selection).
12. See Craig Neff, Den of Vipers, A Sports Scourge: Bad Agents, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 76, available at http://vault.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
vault/article/magazine/MAG1066585/1/index.htm (conveying generally negative
reputa-tion of agents).
13. Id. (describing sports agents according to popular perception).
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Vainisi even referred to agents as "parasites." 14 Additionally, many
team owners and fans believe that player greed, encouraged by
agents, is ruining professional sports.15 Efforts have been made to
enact federal legislation to regulate sports agents, but such legisla-
tion is not binding on states. 16 Each professional league and play-
ers' union is left to ensure that agents meet an ethical standard and
that they act in a manner that is in the best interest of sports.' 7
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SPORTS AGENTS IN PLAYER NEGOTIATIONS
A. History
Today's agents need to be creative when negotiating player bo-
nuses, no-trade clauses, guaranteed contracts and multi-year deals.
The career of each athlete is relatively short, and players rely on
agents to get the most money possible in order to ensure financial
security for the future.18 In this atmosphere, agents must walk a
fine line of being as hardnosed as possible, while still considering
the best long term strategy for their clients and actual producing an
ethically viable deal. In the short-term working with teams con-
cerned about the bottom line may prove difficult, but in the long
run this strategy will probably yield the best return for the players.
Additionally, through negotiation methods like "Final Offer Arbi-
tration," agents may negotiate for intangible and interest-based
benefits such as single occupancy rooms during road trips, higher
food allowances, and the use of private jets, which will reward the
player for his hard work and skills without bleeding a league dry. 19
14. See id. (stating Vainisi's opinion of agents).
15. See Are Agents Ruining Sports?, http://penaltyflagdown.wordpress.com/
2008/04/24/are-agents-ruining-sports/ (Apr. 24, 2008, 1:45) (noticing declining
skill level in NBA and attributing it to money-hungry attitude of players and
agents).
16. See Jeremy J. Geisel, Disbarring Jerry Maguire: How Broadly Defining "Unau-
thorized Practice of Law" Could Take the "Lawyer" Out of "Lawyer-Agent" Despite the Cur-
rent State of Athlete Agent Legislation, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 225, 234 (2008)
(describing legislation that would standardize reporting, registration, and record
keeping for agents). States are not bound by this legislation and may adopt it at
their discretion. See id.
17. See NFL Players' Association Agent Regulations, http://www.nflplayers.
corn/ user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=233&pid=0&type=l (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (listing requirements for NFL agents established by player's union).
18. See In Defense of Pro Athletes, RoCHESTER Crv NEWSPAPER, Dec. 8, 2004,
available at http://www.rochestercitynewspaper.com/archives/2004/12/In-de-
fense-of-pro -athletes/ (discussing that average NFL career lasts just four years).
"The pro athlete has to get everything he can during the short amount of time he
can play." Id.
19. Brien M. Wassner, Major League Baseball's Answer to Salary Disputes and the
Strike: Final Offer Arbitration: A Negotiation Tool Facilitating Adversary Agreement, 6
[Vol. 17: p. 91
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SURVEY: SPORTS AGENTS AS REPRESENTATIVES
Because contemporary deals are often legally complex, there is
an ever-increasing need for competent, reliable and trust-worthy
sports agents. Nevertheless, this modern framework is perhaps not
emphasized enough to athletes, whose sports contracts can poten-
tially involve millions of dollars. These provisions have not always
been so lucrative, partly due to the fact that players in the past com-
monly negotiated their own contracts. 20 These athletes did not pos-
sess the knowledge to negotiate their own contracts and could not
hire people with the proper knowledge to help them.21 Players in
every sport had to fight in order to win the right to negotiate con-
tracts and obtain agent representation. 22 Baseball players were
among the first to use agents, and other sports leagues slowly
caught onto the trend.23 By looking at examples from the past, one
can see just how valuable good agents are and why collaborative
negotiations often yield greater long-term return than adversarial
negotiations.
B. Specific Examples of Past Player-League Negotiations
Major League Baseball ("MLB") player and Hall of Fame in-
ductee Ralph Kiner played during the 1940s and 1950s, when there
were no agents or attorneys to assist players in negotiating con-
tracts. 24 Negotiations took place strictly between a player and his
team's general manager. 25 In that era, a player signed a baseball
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 5, 11 (2003) ("In negotiation for settlement agreements,
the parties can fashion creative solutions .... Players are more inclined to settle
because they can contract to secure benefits such as bonuses, no trade clauses,
guaranteed contracts, multi-year deals, or other more imaginative clauses includ-
ing single occupancy rooms on road trips, or initial payment of hotel charges
rather than reimbursement.").
20. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24 (proposing possible drawbacks
to self-representation). Early examples of athletes negotiating for themselves in-
clude: Danny Ainge of the Boston Celtics, Alan Trammel of the Detroit Tigers, and
Mike Singletary of the Chicago Bears. See id.
21. See Ralph Kiner, The Role of Unions and Arbitration in Professional Baseball, 17
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 159, 161 (1999) (describing lack of agent or attorney
involvement in player contract negotiations).
22. See id. (explaining that Curt Flood led way for free agency in Major
League Baseball).
23. See id. (stating that in 1952, Mr. Kiner did not have ability to use sports
agent). Negotiations took place solely between the player and team ownership,
with the ownership holding most of the control. See id.
24. See Kiner, supra note 21, at 161 (providing example where attorneys or
agents were absent in contract negotiations). Ralph Kiner was a professional base-
ball player for the Pittsburgh Pirates in the 1950s. See id. at 160. He was inducted
into the Major League Baseball Hall of Fame in 1975. See id. at 159.
25. See id. at 161 (illustrating that no one else was allowed into contract nego-
tiation meetings between player and general manager).
2010]
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contract for life and not for a specified period of time.26 Because
no-trade clauses did not yet exist, a player had three choices - agree
to the contract, be traded, or not play baseball. 27
In 1952, Kiner challenged these norms by arriving to a MLB
Executive Council meeting with his attorney.28 However, at the
meeting the Executive Council prohibited the attorney from be-
coming involved in the negotiation. 29 Kiner responded by walking
out of the room, and a lengthy bargaining impasse soon followed. 30
This "take it or leave it" style of negotiating created a lack of player
autonomy, and eventually in 1966, baseball players formed the MLB
Players' Association in order to protect the rights to their careers. 31
In 1970, the Players' Association negotiated for its players to the
right to select the agents that could represent them during their
individual contract negotiations.3 2
Other leagues slowly followed, as Baseball was not the only
sport in which professional players needed a sports agent.33 One
example of this is Billy Cannon, an All-American football player at
Louisiana State University in the late 1950s.3 4 Cannon entered the
1960 NFL draft and was drafted by the Los Angeles Rams.35 After
Cannon signed three standard player contracts with the Rams, a
representative from the Houston Oilers, a team in the rival Ameri-
can Football League ("AFL") contacted him about playing for their
26. See id. (pointing out that baseball 1950s baseball contracts were for life);
see also Jack F. Williams & Jack A. Chambless, Title VII and the Reserve Clause: A
Statistical Analysis of Salary Discrimination in Major League Baseball, 52 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 461, 473 (1997) (stating that contracts bound players for life).
27. See Kiner, supra note 21, at 161 (describing lack of flexibility in 1950s base-
ball contracts).
28. See id. at 162.
29. See id.
30. See id. (indicating bargaining impasse after unwillingness of manager to
negotiate with attorney).
31. See MLBPA Official Site, History of the Major League Baseball Players'
Association, http://www.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Oct. 31, 2009)
(documenting that MLBPA successfully formed into labor union in late 1960s).
32. See Maury Brown, Let's Talk: A Look at Player Agents, THE HARDBALL TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2006, available at http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/ets-talk-a-
look-at-player-agents-part-I -legends/ (discussing success of negotiations for players
to have agent representation).
33. See Sports Lawyers Association, History of the SLA, www.sportslaw.org/his-
tory.cfm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (establishing basic history of agents and their
involvement in sports).
34. See L.A. Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717, 719 (S.D. Cal.
1960) (providing background information about Cannon).
35. See id. After winning a tiebreaker for first draft choice, the Rams chose
Cannon as the overall number one draft pick. See My NFL Draft.com, First Overall
NFL Draft Picks, http://www.mynfldraft.com/NFL-First-Overall-Draft-Picks (last
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
[Vol. 17: p. 91
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team.36 Following a meeting with the Oilers' management, Cannon
sent a letter to the Rams stating he no longer wished to remain a
Ram and returned the money he had been given. 37 The Rams
sought an injunction to prevent Cannon from playing in the AFL. 38
The Court allowed Cannon to breach his contract, stating that be-
cause he was "without counsel or advice and the whole transaction
... was completed in less than 48 hours," the actions of Cannon
and the Rams did not create a binding contract.39 The Southern
District of California found that "amateur athletes need agent rep-
resentation in order to protect their interests and match the negoti-
ating skill of a general manager or member of a professional
team."40
Historically, coaches and sports leagues have been wary of
working with sports agents, perhaps because sports agents empower
their players, helping them get more money and benefits than the
leagues would like to give. 41 For example, Jim Ringo, a 1960s all-
pro center for the National Football League's ("NFL") Green Bay
Packers needed to negotiate a new contract early in his career. 42
Ringo brought an agent with him to a 1963 meeting with legendary
Packer's coach Vince Lombardi.43 According to Packer's legend,
Coach Lombardi left the room and phoned the Philadelphia Eagles
to make a trade. 44 At the time, Lombardi probably refused to nego-
tiate with the agent, because agents had a bad reputation and were
not widely utilized in the league.4
5
36. See Cannon, 185 F. Supp. at 719-20 (discussing contact between Cannon
and Oilers' owner).
37. See id. at 720 (describing Cannon's actions following meeting with Oilers'
management).
38. See id. at 718 (stating Rams' desire for injunctive relief against Cannon to
prevent him from playing for another team).
39. See id. at 726-27 (setting forth reasons for invalidating contract).
40. See id. at 719.
41. See ChrisJenkins, Hall of Fame Center Jim Ringo Dead at 75, USA TODAY, Nov.
19, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/2007-11-19-
1249147646_x.htm (documenting that Ringo played for Packers until his 1963
contract dispute).
42. See id.
43. See Robert B. Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, or Is It a Player
Agent, Player Representative, Sports Agent, Contract Advisor, Family Advisor, or Contract
Representative?, 1 ViLL. SPoRTs & Er. L.J. 11, 39-40 (1994) (indicating that Ringo
took agent to meeting with Lombardi).
44. See id. (detailing Lombardi's actions after Ringo arrived with agent).
45. SeeJenkins, supra note 41 (explaining why Lombardi would be uncomfort-
able negotiating with agents). According to former Packers teammate Willie Davis,
"Jim was probably not out of place ... But at that point, Lombardi was not pre-
pared to have an intermediary. Agents, of course, now are an accepted part of the
2010]
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Though teams may not like dealing with agents, agents are now
a usual and essential part of any professional athlete's life. Never-
theless, there exists a potential for agents to earn large commissions
at the expense of their clients and against the interest of the
player's team. The only possible solution is to better train agents in
collaborative negotiations and to create a code of strict ethical regu-
lations, which will force agents to work more with sports leagues
instead of against them.
C. The Expanding Role of Sports Agents and Their
Questionable Ethical Practices
1. Sports Agent Training and Responsibilities
Competition among sports agents has created an intense pres-
sure to successfully negotiate contracts for big-name athletes.46 Al-
though, the original function of sports agents was to negotiate
contracts for players, the role of the agent has greatly expanded.47
Many agents now serve as financial managers, public relations spe-
cialists, investment as well as tax experts, and legal counsel, all of
which require agents to perform specific functions, including the
following:
Sports agents provide a variety of functions on behalf of play-
ers, including (1) Determining the value of a player's services; (2)
Negotiation of the player's contract with the club, including salary,
incentives, bonuses, guarantees, no-trade clauses, and length of
contract; (3) Soliciting and arranging product endorsements,
speaking engagements, and other uses of the player's name and
image for commercial purposes; (4) Promoting the athlete's career
through public relations, media coverage, and charitable activities;
(5) Providing financial management services; (6) Resolving con-
flicts that arise concerning areas such as enforcement of employ-
ment contracts, and behavioral problems such as substance abuse;
(7) Representing players in salary or grievance arbitration matters;
today's game, something Davis said Lombardi would have struggled with." See id.
(internal quotations omitted).
46. See Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State
Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System
May Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1225, 1227 (2004) ("The competition
for these athletes has intensified to the extent that many agents have become will-
ing to do whatever it takes to corral college athletes into signing an agency con-
tract before they have finished college or officially declared themselves
professionals").
47. See Staudohar, supra note 1, at 248-49 (explaining how role of agent has
expanded).
[Vol. 17: p. 91
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(8) Arranging for movement of the player in the labor market; (9)
Counseling a player about his post-career years, etc. 48
With these expanded roles, there are several values to attend-
ing law school prior to becoming an agent. These attributes includ-
ing the chance to develop a "trained eye to catch small but
important contract details that might not be in the best interests of
your client. '49 More specifically, and agent with legal training as a
transactional attorney may benefit pro athletes with "property sales
and purchases, investment oversight, formulation of trust, wills, and
LLCs, prenuptials, and other needs that high-income earners may
have."50 The non-attorney-agent may not possess the same skill set
to help safeguard the athlete's assets.51 Too often, there are stories
of athletes who made millions of dollars and squandered the money
before the end of their careers, because these athletes didn't have
the instruction of a trained professional to help them make better
financial and life choices and any agent in their life may not taken
the appropriate steps to help them.52
Another big problem with non-attorney agents is that outside
of passing a licensing test, sports agents licensing requires little to
no requirements or background checks. This problem, in turn, cre-
ates the problem of inability to seek redress against negligent non-
attorney agents. Agent licensing does not provide training sessions
or specific ethical instructions. Unlike state bar associations that
conduct rigorous background and character checks on each lawyer
before admitting them, a players' association may not take the time
or resources to conduct a comprehensive investigation. 53 Similarly,
48. Id. ("However, a single person rarely provides all of the functions. It is not
uncommon for the agency function to be bifurcated into a single agent handling
all aspects of negotiations on behalf of players . . .while another agent or firm
handles financial management and planning tasks.").
49. Jack Bechta, Two Paths to Becoming an Agent, NAT'L FOOTBALL POST, June
30, 2009, available at http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/Two-paths-to-becom-
ing-an-agent.html.
50. Id.
51. See id. ("If you want to become an agent, law school is not a must but will
definitely help your cause and give you some credibility with players and their
families.").
52. See Lawrence Delevingne, 10 Ways Sports Stars Destroy Their Finances, Bus.
INSIDER, Sept. 18, 2009, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/10-ways-
sports-stars-destroy-their-finances-2009-9 (listing ways professional athletes squan-
der money).
53. See Marc J. Kessler, Who Can Best Represent Professional Athletes: Lawyer vs.
Non-Lawyer, COLUMBUS BAR BRIEFS, Spring 2005, at 20, available at http://www.hah-
nloeser.com/references/308.pdf ("[E]ven though the players associations have
taken great steps forward to protect their members, the industry of sports agentry
is devoid of systematically enforceable regulations, which truly dictate minimum
levels of professional expertise or accountability.").
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agent licensing does not include any assessment of skill level or
character. Last, because of the sparse standards and nominal set
expectations for non-attorney agents, is that it is more difficult to
sue a non-attorney agent. If no expectations are set, it becomes
hard to prove a non-attorney agent did not perform an adequate
job.
Conversely, attorneys have strict codes of professional conduct.
A professional athlete may have greater redress against an attorney-
agent in a malpractice action than against a non-attorney-agent. 54
Thus, for the time being, athletes can better protect themselves by
hiring attorney agents, so that they can seek redress if something
goes wrong in their negotiations. As this paper will later argue,
such a step would remain unnecessary if an overarching sports code
was created that would sanction inappropriate agent behavior and
protect athletes regardless of whether their agent was or was not an
attorney.
2. The Unethical Side of Sports Agenting
Ethics play a large part in the agent industry.55 Unfortunately,
for clients with "non-attorney" agents, there are no mandated ethi-
cal codes of conduct. 56 Furthermore, there is dispute among attor-
ney-agents as to whether they should be held to the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility when their non-attorney agent counter-
parts are not.57 This view, however, has not been shared by some
courts, which have held that "[a] s long as a lawyer is engaged in the
practice of law, he is bound by the ethical requirements of that pro-
fession, and he may not defend his actions by contending that he
was engaged in some other kind of professional activity."58 This
54. See generally Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and
Unintended Consequences, 42 WIL[AMETrE L. REv. 781, 805 (2006) ("Because of their
status as attorneys, these agents are subject to attorney disciplinary rules and stan-
dards of professional conduct governing attorneys, such as the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. A violation of these standards may result in a state bar disci-
plinary body taking action against attorneys.").
55. See generally SHROPSHIRE & DAviS, supra note 5, at 88-98 (discussing role of
ethics in sports agent industry).
56. See id. at 89 (describing ethical code to which attorney-agents are held).
Non-attorney agents are subject to general principles of agency law, but the disci-
plinary rules that govern attorneys do not apply. See id.
57. See id. at 91 (contrasting treatment between attorney agents and non-attor-
ney agents). In theory, a sports agent is engaging in the practice of law by negoti-
ating contracts. See id. at 91-92. However, a non-attorney agent is not held to an
ethical code. See id. Thus, attorney agents argue that the act of contract negotia-
tion in sports is not, in fact, engaging in the practice of law, and thus an equal set
of rules should apply to both the attorney and non-attorney agent. See id.
58. In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1977).
[Vol. 17: p. 91
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standard may place attorney-agents at a marketplace disadvantage
to their "non-attorney-agent counterparts" who are not held to such
ethical rules.59
The amount of money typically made by professional athletes
has caused several agents to go to unscrupulous measures to make
the most money possible.60 In some instances, agents are not inter-
ested in the best possible playing scenario for their client, but in-
stead, how they personally can make the most money.61 Depending
on the collective bargaining agreement of the league, agents stand
to make anywhere from two to five percent commission on a
player's negotiated contract. 62 For example, Scott Boras could have
made $14 million on the 2008 deal he negotiated for the Yankees'
Alex Rodriguez.6 3
Besides the general perils of negotiation and agent-league rela-
tions, collective bargaining agreements present another potential
contractual hindrance for players and agents.64 In a typical collec-
tive bargaining agreement, an individual player gives up the free-
59. See Geisel, supra note 16, at 226 (observing that attorney-agents are held to
higher standard than non-attorney agents).
60. See Bryan Couch, How Agent Competition and Corruption Affects Sports and the
Athlete-Agent Relationship and What Can Be Done to Control It, 10 SETON HALLJ. SPORT
L. 111, 118 (2000) ("The only concern was the almighty dollar, both for the player
and the agent, which turns athletics into a business full of overpaid egomaniacs
more concerned with the best contract or endorsement deal than with the game
itself."). Because of limits on the amount of an agent's commission, some agents
resort to lies and exaggeration in order to steal clients from other agents. See id. at
119-20.
61. See generally id. at 112, 124-29 (discussing agent greed at expense of inter-
ests of client).
62. See SHROPSHIRE & DAvS, supra note 5, at 5 (stating percentage of contract
agents typically receive).
63. SeeJerry Crasnick, Boras Took a Hit, But He'll Survive, ESPN.coM, Nov.19,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnistRasnick-
jerry&id=31176 86 (speculating that with added incentives, Rodriguez's deal could
total up to $300 million).
64. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., Center for Continuing Legal Education: Self Study
Article and Self Assessment Test, Sports Law, http://www.cce-mcle.com/tests/s s6004.
htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (discussing collective bargaining in sports).
Collective bargaining agreements express the complete range of relation-
ships between management and their athlete employees. This document
will specify the scope of the union-management agreement and will pro-
hibit the use of either strikes or lockouts. Although the collective bargain-
ing agreement will vary with the sport, it will cover at a minimum the
following: club discipline, non-injury grievances, commissioner discipline,
injury grievances, the SPK, college draft, option clauses, waivers, base sala-
ries, access to personnel files, medical rights, retirement, insurance and
the duration of the [collective bargaining agreement].
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dom to contract for him or herself "for the good of the group. '"65
Salary terms and other conditions of employment bind all members
of the collective bargaining unit under the terms of one contract.66
Therefore, an existing collective bargaining agreement constrains
the ability of an agent to negotiate for an individual player, and
thus, they can create tensions between one player and the rest of
the team, since additional money given to one player takes money
away from his teammates. 67 An example of one such constraint is
the NFL's rookie pool.68 In the NFL rookie pool, the NFL estab-
lishes an amount of money that may be used for first-year players. 69
In this rookie pool, while agents are helpful in negotiating roster or
signing bonuses, the collective bargaining agreement uses a de
facto slotted pay scale. 70 This scale "involves paying draft choices
the same amount of money received by the player drafted in the
same position or slot in the previous draft, plus a percentage raise
to reflect inflation. '' 71 An agent who touts that he or she can get an
NFL draftee the most amount of money is not being entirely truth-
ful with the client, because the funds are coming from a finite pool
that is largely predetermined based on draft number; perhaps the
agent could negotiate for a contract that offered more than the
team originally intended, but each team still has a salary cap. 72
These situations can become tense, as agents try to wrestle more
65. See Ethan Lock, The Regulatory Scheme for Player Representatives in the National
Football League: The Real Power of Jerry Maguire, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 319, 321 (1998)
(explaining that collective bargaining agreements are meant to get best terms for
all group members).
66. See id. at 320 (listing items typically covered by collective bargaining
agreements).
67. See id (highlighting that when majority of employees, or players, chooses
to be represented by union, that union becomes exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for all employees in that unit).
68. See id at 324-35. (explaining rookie pool pay scale).
69. See id at 322 (describing salary cap).
70. See generally Scott R. Rosner, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 193, 244-45 (2004).
71. Id. ESPN analyst Len Pasquarelli described the pool as follows:
The rookie pool is essentially a cap within a cap. It represents the maxi-
mum amount that each franchise can spend, in terms of total cap dollars,
on its first-year players. A team's rookie allocation pool is part of, not in
addition to, the league's overall spending limit of about $127 million per
franchise. The formula for arriving at each team's rookie pool is viewed
as somewhat Byzantine by even the most astute number-crunchers in the
NFL. It is basically a function of how many overall choices each club
makes and where those picks are slotted in each round.
Len Pasquarelli, Lions Lead in Rookie Allocation Money, ESPN.coM, http://sports.
espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4111513 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
72. See Associated Press, NFL Cap Rises $12 Million to $128 Million for 2009,
ESPN.coM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id-4169590 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009) (showing 2009 NFL season set salary cap per team at $128 million).
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money away from the league and the team. Additionally, agents in
these situations may resort to adversarial or deceptive tactics to try
get as much money as possible in the short-term for their clients
and also to make the client think that all money and benefits re-
ceived were solely because of his negotiating. Agents need to be
held accountable for all unethical practices that arise in these situa-
tions, and this paper suggests that perhaps the best way to hold
agents accountable would be by developing an industry-wide sports
agent's ethical code. 73 Below are specific examples of other ethical
problems that have already arisen in the sports arena.
One questionable practice of agents is encouraging clients to
opt out of contracts that they didn't negotiate in favor of new con-
tracts in which the agent would collect a hefty commission.7 4 One
situation in which this arguably occurred was with football player
Terrell Owens and his acquired agent, Drew Rosenhaus. 75 In 2005,
Terrell Owens was a star wide receiver for the Philadelphia Eagles. 7 6
Attorney Drew Rosenhaus became Owens' agent in the middle of
his contract and, as a result, did not collect any commission from
that deal. 77 Rosenhaus convinced Owens he was not being paid fair
market value in order to entice him to holdout until a new contract
was offered. 78 The Eagles refused to renegotiate the contract, and
Owens and Rosenhaus' actions proved to be a major distraction to
the team. 79 After a colorful season, the Eagle suspended Owens for
73. For a further discussion of ethical codes applied to agents, see infra, notes
285-309 and accompanying text.
74. See Richard T. Karcher, Solving Problems in the Player Representation Business:
Unions Should be the "Exclusive" Representatives of the Players, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REv.
737, 769 (2006) (remarking that Terrell Owens' reputation was damaged as result
of Drew Rosenhaus' attempt to "renegotiate Terrell's existing contract, insisting
that his client was not being paid fair market value.").
75. See Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Agent of Agitation, TIME, Nov. 13, 2005, available
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1129560,00.html
(describing how after Rosenhaus began representing Owens in middle of his con-
tract, Owens surprisingly began negotiating for new contract with higher salary
and inferring that this was no coincidence).
76. See Profile of Terrell Owens, http://www.nfl.com/players/terrellowens/
profile?id=OWE755129 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (providing statistics about
Owens and his career). In the first seven games of the 2005 season with the Eagles,
Owens had 47 receptions for 763 yards and six touchdowns. See id.
77. See Coates, supra note 75 (discussing when Drew Rosenhaus relationship
with Terrell Owens began).
78. See Eric Schmeltzer, Ralph Nader: Attention Whore, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-schmeltzer/ralph-nader-at-
tention-who bA10463.html (describing how Rosenhaus persuaded Owens that he
deserved better contract).
79. See id. (stating that Eagles would not renegotiate Owens' contract and
describing altercations between Owens and Eagles' players and coaches). Owens
yelled at coaches, made rude remarks to teammates, and even got into a physical
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four games, and at the end of the season, he was unable to obtain a
new contract.80 He ultimately signed with the Dallas Cowboys, and
earned Rosenhaus a beneficial commission.8 1
3. How Necessary Is a Sports Agent?
Players are constantly expecting more from their agents, but
many do not realize that a contract has very little to do with the
agent's negotiating talents.8 2 It is the player's success on the field,
court, or ice, rather, that leads to a more lucrative contract.8 3 Certi-
fied baseball and basketball agent Keith Kreiter commented, "Every
contract is just a form agreement. My plummer [sic] could negoti-
ate a first-round pick's contract as good as the next negotiator in
the country can."'8 4 On the other hand, some players and coaches
feel that they don't have the required business acumen to negotiate
their own contract.85 As University of Iowa football coach Kirk Fer-
entz said, "All I know is football. I know coaching a little bit. But I
altercation in the locker room with a former player. See id. ("Owens ... yelled at
his Head Coach Andy Reid to 'shut up,' told his offensive coordinator not to talk
to him 'unless I talk to you first,' implied that Donovan McNabb was dogging it in
the Super Bowl, said McNabb was a 'hypocrite,' and refused to take part in a sched-
uled autograph session with other players.").
80. See Len Pasquarelli, Eagles Suspend T.O. Indefinitely for Comments, ESPN.
COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli-len&
id=2214754 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (recording suspension of Terrell Owens by
Philadelphia Eagles "for conduct detrimental to his team" after another public
outburst). See also Reid: T.O Will Not Play for Eagles This Season, ESPN.com, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2216703 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (dis-
closing that Terrell Owens would not return to play for Philadelphia Eagles follow-
ing suspension).
81. See A Star is Born: Owens Signs with the Cowboys, ESPN.coM, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2374189 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (relay-
ing Terrell Owens' new position with Dallas Cowboys). Owens has since changed
teams and currently plays for the Buffalo Bills. See Owens Inks 1-Year, $6.5M deal
with Bills, ESPN.coM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3960653 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) ("Owens, 35, caught 69 passes for 1,052 yards and 10 touch-
downs last season with Dallas. But the Cowboys were looking to improve the atmos-
phere in the locker room and decided they would be better off without him.").
82. See Lock, supra note 65, at 336 (stating that negotiations are fueled by
player abilities rather than those of agent).
83. See id. at 337 ("Negotiations for veteran players are driven by a number of
factors, including teams' evaluations of a player's skills, individual team needs, and
the availability of other players of equal or greater ability at the same position.").
84. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 28.
85. See Michael McCarthy & Steve Wieberg, Reviled or Loved, Agents Get Results,
USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/
2006-11-17-coaches-agents-x.htm (reflecting that some coaches do not feel com-
fortable negotiating without agent).
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have zero knowledge when it comes to the business aspect of
things."86
Mostly, the market for an athlete in a sports league is largely a
result of team needs and how a team views the free-agent market-
place.8 7 However, agents sometimes misread the marketplace, at
great costs to their clients.88 For example, baseball player Manny
Ramirez overestimated the demand for his skills and damaged his
prospects as a result.89 In 1998, he turned down several lucrative
short-term offers based on the advice of his agent Scott Boras, who
was convinced that Manny could get a four-or-five year contract.9°
As of February 2009, with Manny unsigned, it became clear that he
would not receive the massive contract he initially sought.91 Subse-
quently in March 2009, Ramirez signed a two-year, $45 million con-
tract with the Los Angeles Dodgers, including a whopping $25
million of deferred monies. 92
Though, it is important to note that while an athlete's skills are
the most important factor in the athlete's contractual power, ath-
letes still need advice on the legal matters involved in creating those
contracts.93 As NBA superstar LeBron James discovered, agents
86. Id.
87. See generally Pat Kirwan, Examining the Factors that Went into Some Teams'
Draft Decisions, NFL.coM, http://www.nfl.com/draft/story?id=09000d5d80813f4c&
template=with-video&confirm-tue (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (articulating factors
some teams use when deciding which players to draft in football). See also John
Keim, Free Agent orDraft Pick?, THE EXAMINER, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.examiner.
com/a-1247197-Free-agent ordraft pick_.html (discussing whether Washington
Redskins should rely on draft picks or free-agent prospects).
88. See Bill Plaschke, Manny Ramirez's Lesson in Leverage, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/05/sports/sp-plaschke-
manny-ramirez5 (insinuating Manny Ramirez's agent Scott Boras misread baseball
market by failing to sign with Dodgers while other teams were not showing
interest).
89. See id. (describing damage to Ramirez's reputation from holding out on
signing contract).
90. See Manny Ramirez Tops the List of Free Agents Demanding Huge Con-
tracts, http://www.faniq.com/blog/Manny-Ramirez-Tops-The-List-Of-Free-Agents-
Demanding-Huge-Contracts-Blog-13321 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (stating that
Ramirez turned down short term deal in favor of longer one).
91. See Plaschke, supra note 88 (indicating that Ramirez signed with Dodgers
and implying that Ramirez did so because he realized he would not get contract he
wanted).
92. See id. (stating terms of Ramirez's contract with Dodgers). See also Jon
Heyman, Boras Tells Dodgers Manny Will Accept $45 Million Deal with Deferrals, SI.coM,
Feb. 27, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/02/27/
manny. dodgers/index.html (explaining more about Ramirez's contract terms).
93. See Liz Mullen, Can Maverick Carter Prove Critics Wrong?, SPoRTs Bus.J., Oct.
24, 2005, http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/47508 (reporting that af-
ter LeBron fired his agent and hired his close friends, he still retained attorney to
assist with legal matters).
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need to be available to athletes to make sure the athletes' contracts
and finances are protected and soundly invested.94 In 2005,
LeBron James shocked the league when he fired his agent and
hired three friends to take over management duties.9 5 As one of
the most popular, lucrative, and visible athletes in the world, NBA
management was worried about how three highly inexperienced
young men would manage James's career.96 At the time, LeBron
said that he "wanted to give his friends a chance to create a profes-
sional legacy beyond being flunkies and hangers-on. '97 James, how-
ever, who has companies fighting for his signature on sponsorship
deals, soon realized the need for an attorney-agent. 98 In addition
to the team of legal, financial, and public relations professionals
associated with LeBron's friend-run marketing empire, he has now
retained the services of Leon Rose, a well-known attorney-agent. 99
When hundreds of millions of dollars are on the line, a professional
athlete's affairs cannot be left to inexperience, chance and
friendship. 100
Also illustrating the need for an attorney-agent in the contract
negotiation process is baseball superstar Gary Sheffield.' 0 ' In 2003,
he fired his agent Scott Boras, referring to Boras as a "bad per-
94. See id. (discussing James's attorney's involvement in contract negotiation
and business matters).
95. See Darren Rovell, LeBron Fires Agents, Possibly in Favor of Friend, ESPN.coM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=20571 25 (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (dissecting LeBron's decision to fire his agent and hire his closest friend, as
well as his road manager). See also The Incredible Drive of LeBron James, 60 MINUTES,
Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/26/60minutes/
main4895042_page4.shtml ("Two of his partners, Richard Paul and Randy Mimms,
had no business background at all. And the then 23-year-old CEO Maverick Carter
had only a marketing course and an internship at Nike to draw on. A lot of peo-
ple, including the commissioner of the NBA, worried that it might be a recipe for
disaster.").
96. See The Incredible Drive of LeBron James, supra note 95 (discussing worry of
NBA commissioner).
97. Tim Arango, LeBron Inc.: The Building of a Billion-Dollar Athlete, CNN
MONEY, Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/28/news/
news makers/lebronjames.fortune/index.htm.
98. See Mullen, supra note 93 (mentioning LeBron hired noted attorney Leon
Rose to handle legal matters).
99. See id. (describing professionals working with James and adding Rose to
team).
100. See id. (expressing uncertainty regarding LeBron's friends having promi-
nent role in his management).
101. See Jack Curry & David Picker, The Yankees Deal Sheffield to the Tigers for
Prospects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/full
page.html?res=9501 E4D61 F3FF932A25752C1A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&page
wanted=all (reporting that Sheffield acts as his own agent).
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son." 10 2 Sheffield decided that rather than hire a new agent, he
would serve as his own agent. 10 3 In doing so, Sheffield potentially
left millions of dollars on the table and in his new contract he failed
to negotiate a no-trade clause for himself.'0 4 Without this clause, a
team signing Sheffield could trade him at any time without his con-
sent, which is exactly what the New York Yankees did in 2006.105
All of these examples show that, even though a players' skill is
his best selling point, agents are still necessary to ensure that the
player is protected, compensated and remains in the sport as long
as possible. Though agents often overestimate and overstate their
power in contract negotiation to their clients, they still have value
and are necessary to athletes to explain legal, contractual, financial
and other concepts. Players should be aware of all of this in order
to choose the best agent and make the best career choices. In fact,
a competent agent, among other things would most likely explain
this to his client and would not "hide the ball" in regard to impor-
tant decisions.
4. Current Hindrances to Proper Agent Conduct
The best agents "can and should be able not only to provide
the player with the information necessary to evaluate and reject a
low offer but also to push the team to its upper limit or highest
offer."1 0 6 However, on another level involving ethical dealings,
many agents seek to foster a sense of dependency in their clients:
"They don't want players to be able to think for themselves. It's sort
of like an addiction to drugs. A lot of things that normal people do
in the course of life, they never experience because they have some-
body doing it for them."'1 7 As a result, agents who adhere to an
ethical code risk being pushed out of the business by more unethi-
cal or nefarious agents, and thus risk losing their clients to other
102. See Sheffield: Ex-Agent Boras Is a Bad Person, THE SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 21,
2008, www.sportingnews.com/mlb/article/2008-02-21/sheffield-ex-agent-boras-
bad-per-son (claiming that Boras was going after money from Sheffield that he did
not deserve).
103. See id. (indicating Sheffield would represent himself).
104. See Curry & Picker, supra note 101 (reporting trade of Sheffield to Tigers
and disclosing lack of no-trade clause).
105. See Tigers Deal Three Pitchers to Yankees for Sheffield, ESPN.coM, http://
sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2656847 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (stat-
ing that Yankees traded Sheffield to Detroit Tigers in exchange for right-handed
pitchers Humberto Sanchez, Kevin Whelan and Anthony Claggett).
106. Lock, supra note 65, at 341.
107. JERRY CRASNICK, LICENSE TO DEAL: A SEASON ON THE RUN WITH A MAVER-
ICK BASEBALL AGENT 29 (Rodale Books 2005).
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agents.108 This situation is yet another ethical problem which
needs further evaluation and which could be solved through stan-
dard industry ethical rules. The current system provides no protec-
tion or incentive for agents who follow the "rules," that is those who
act ethically even in the absence of established ethical rules.
In the current system, even though stealing clients could po-
tentially form the basis of a tort claim for interference with contrac-
tual relations, these suits are not usually brought, because "stealing
clients" has become industry standard. 109 In Speakers of Sport, Inc. v.
Proserv, Inc., the Seventh Circuit stated, "There is in general nothing
wrong with one sports agent trying to take a client from another if
this can be done without precipitating a breach of contract." 110
The circuit court noted that fierce competitiveness is the corner-
stone of the free market economy."' Except in extreme circum-
stances, agents are not disciplined for soliciting another agent's
clients.' 12 Even if a court or players union tries to bring charges
against a poaching agent, these are difficult to prove, and players
have little incentive to complain about an unethical agent."13
Often, "players have no interest in testifying against their current
agent who improperly solicited and stole them from their previous
agent," especially when the poaching agent has treated them to
fancy dinners and lavish gifts. 14
However, an agent's peers would have an incentive to report
their fellow agents who have been stealing clients from them. How-
ever, this seldom happens because agents are hesitant to "rat" on
each other. But when agents do report each other, it can have dev-
astating effects, as it did with agent David Dunn. The example of
Dunn shows how implementing a devastating rule governing client
stealing would dissuade agents from engaging in such action and
would therefore provide greater protection for athletes.
108. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 103 (discussing case law involv-
ing agents attempting to take clients from each other in competition).
109. Lock, supra note 65, at 336.
110. Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. Proserv, Inc., 178 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999).
"Despite its recognition of the competitive nature of the business, the court noted
an important limitation: the competitor's privilege does not validate inducing cli-
ents by way of fraud." SHROPSHIRE & DAvis, supra note 5, at 103
111. See Speakers of Sport, 178 F.3d at 865 (indicating nature of market).
112. See Karcher, supra note 74, at 762 (identifying disincentives of reporting
instances of "stealing" clients). It is not always clear whether the agent solicited the
client or the other way around, so these situations often go unpunished without an
egregious violation. See id.
113. See id. (stating that players do not desire burden of lawsuit in which they
would have to testify against their current agents).
114. Id.
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In 2003, the NFL Players Association suspended NFL attorney-
agent David Dunn for two years for trying to steal clients from his
former partner, Leigh Steinberg.1 15 Dunn left Steinberg's agency,
Steinberg, Moorad and Dunn Inc., to launch a competing firm,
Athletes First, and took approximately fifty NFL players in the pro-
cess. 1 6 In doing so, he destroyed the firm that dominated pro foot-
ball for 20 years.' 17 Steinberg sued and won $44.6 million in
damages. 1 8 When the NFLPA suspended Dunn, he filed for per-
sonal bankruptcy, halting all administrative actions against him.119
This lawsuit had a devastating financial effect on Dunn, and put his
ability to represent players in the future in jeopardy.1 20
III. CURRENT AGENT REGULATIONS
In 1983, as a result of NFLPA action, the NFL became the first
professional sports league to regulate agents. 21 Under the agree-
ment, Teams can only negotiate a player's contract with certified
agents. 122 Any Individual seeking certification as an NFL contract
115. See Liz Mullen, NFLPA Hasn't Given up on Disciplining Dunn, SPORTS Bus.
J., Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/49103
(reporting punishment of David Dunn for stealing clients from his former
partner).
116. See Mark Hyman, Superagent Ieigh Steinberg: Pro Football's Wild Man, Bus.
WEEK, Nov. 25, 2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/con-
tent/02_47/b3809126.htm (establishing facts of situation between Dunn and
Steinberg).
117. See id. (describing consequences of decision to leave agency and launch
competing firm).
118. Liz Mullen, NFLPA Committee Votes To Suspend David Dunn For Two Years,
SPORTS Bus. J., Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/arti-
cle/106669 (discussing fallout from trial testimony). This decision was later over-
turned based on trial errors, and Dunn's suspension was put on hold while he
handled bankruptcy issues. See id. (elaborating upon trial aftermath).
119. See id. (discussing NFLPA decision to suspend Dunn, and Dunn's subse-
quent file for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy).
120. See Darren Heitner, Agent Spotlight: David Dunn, SPORTS AGENT BLOG,
http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2006/01/31/agent-spotlight-david-dunn/ (Jan.
31, 2006) (stressing negative effects of verdict against sports agent and stressing
that while some people had accused sports agent Drew Rosenhaus of stealing cli-
ents, no players had filed actual claims against him).
121. See Melissa Neiman, FAIR GAME: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN NEGOTIA-
TION BY SPORTS AGENTS, at 6, (Aug. 2007), available at http://works.bepress.com/
melissa neiman /3 (follow "download the paper" hyperlink) (naming NFLPA as
first association to regulate activities of agents).
122. See NFL PLAYERS AsSOCtATION, NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advi-
sors, at 7-9, available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181
&lmid=233&pid=0&type=l (follow "download a PDF version of the regulations"
hyperlink) (establishing rules governing negotiations between teams and agents).
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advisor must take a test and fulfill other essential requirements. 23
The test has questions based on the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the salary cap and the free agency system. 124 Potential agents
who fail this exam may be suspended or decertified by the NFL
Players Association. 12 5
In addition to NFL, some states have agent regulation acts
aimed at protecting student-athletes. 126 Many rookie athletes are
too trusting and vulnerable when negotiating their first contract
with an agent.127 One problem is that if an agent is not an attorney,
a player cannot bring suit against the agent for malpractice. 128 Al-
though, a players union may require an agent to carry professional
liability insurance, the NFL Players' Association is the only player's
union to require an agent to carry malpractice insurance. 129 The
National Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") guidelines.
specify that a student-athlete may receive advice from an attorney
regarding a proposed professional contract, but that attorney may
not represent the athlete in negotiation.13 0
123. See id. at 10-14 (providing requirements for becoming NFL agent). Indi-
viduals wishing to be certified as NFL agents must now have a master's degree. Id.
Other certification requirements include: a $1,650.00 application fee, passing the
NFLPA test, attendance at a two (2) day seminar in Washington, DC, and success-
ful completion of a written, proctored examination. Id. Following successfully
passing the exam, the agent must obtain professional liability insurance from an
approved carrier. Id.; see also The Sports Law Professor, The Problem with NFL Player
Agents, http://thesportslawprofessor.blogspot.com/2007/10/problem-with-nfl-
player-agents.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (exemplifying that moving toward
greater education is one way NFL tries to protect its players).
124. See NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, supra note 122, at Appendix A (outlining
test for sports agent certification).
125. See id. at 2-11 (discussing when agent may be deleted from NFLPA
registry).
126. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 139; see also NCAA, Uniform Ath-
lete Agents Act (UAAA) History and Status, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/
ncaa/ncaa/legislation+and+governance/eligibility+and+recruiting/agents+and+
amateurism/uaaa/history.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (including support for
nationwide use of Uniform Athletes Agent Act).
127. See Alabama Crimson Tide, Making the Selection (last visited Oct. 31,
2009), www.rolltide.com/datadump/fls-files/files/files/14859.pdf (offering help-
ful procedures for rookie athletes signing first contract).
128. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24 (addressing course of redress
for athletes with attorney agents compared to athletes with non-attorney athletes).
129. See Karcher, supra note 74 (explaining that NFLPA requires malpractice
insurance with minimum annual premium of $2,500).
130. See The National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2009-10 NCAA Division I
Manual, NCAA PUBLICATIONS, Aug. 1, 2009, at 69, available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/Uploads/PDF/Dl-Manua9d74aOb2-dI Od-4587-8902-
b0c781el28ae. pdf (quoting "12.3.2 Legal Counsel. Securing advice from a lawyer
concerning a proposed professional sports contract shall not be considered con-
tracting for representation by an agent under this rule, unless the lawyer also rep-
resents the individual in negotiations for such a contract").
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A. Issues Involving Conflicts of Interest
1. Agents Representing Multiple Clients
A conflict of interest occurs when a duty owed to one party is
"compromised by a separate interest or agreement with a third
party." 31 Conflicts of interest may arise if an agent represents mul-
tiple players who play the same position, or play for the same team,
and both are trying to negotiate contracts.1 3 2 In 1996, attorney-
agent David Falk faced this problem when he represented top bas-
ketball playerJuwan Howard and tried to negotiate a deal with the
NBA's Miami Heat.1 33 When the deal fell through, Falk secured a
contract for Howard with the Washington Bullets. 134 In doing so,
Falk neglected one of his average players, Rex Chapman, who
wanted to re-sign with the Miami Heat and was unable to do so.1 35
If an agent gets a higher contract for one player, it may cause a rift
in his or her relationship with another player, or may slight the
average player in favor of the superstar client.13 6
In the case of rookie NFL players, an agent may try to negotiate
two or more contracts from a finite pool of money, because when
one player takes up more salary cap room less money is available for
the other player. 137 Such an example occurred in 2006 when
quarterback Jay Cutler entered the NFL draft from Vanderbilt Uni-
versity.' 38 He hired James "Bus" Cook, a licensed attorney, to re-
present him.' 39 Cutler and his family told Cook that they did not
want Cook to represent another top quarterback, a reasonable re-
quest for a player desiring his agent to look out for his best inter-
131. SHROPSHIRE & DAVis, supra note 5, at 79.
132. See id. at 81-84 (discussing conditions giving rise to conflicts of interest).
133. See Lynn Hirschberg, The Big Man Can Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/17/magazine/the-big-man-can-
deal.html?pagewanted=all (raising agent's problems with representing multiple
players).
134. See id. (detailing history of player's search for team).
135. See id. (discussing fallout of agent's negotiations and conflicts of
interest).
136. See id. (discussing repercussions arising out of conflicts of interests).
137. See Neiman, supra note 121, at 8-15 (identifying ethical obligations and
considerations for agents representing multiple players).
138. See History of the NF, NFL.coM http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/full
draft?season=2006 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (detailing 2006 NFL draft class); See
also Liz Mullen, "Big 3" Shake Up the Agent Signing Process, SPORTS Bus. J., Jan. 16,
2006, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=ar-
ticle.preview&articlelD=48835 (discussing effect of three uniquely talented players
entering NFL draft).
139. See Mullen, supra note 138 (depicting player's selection of agent).
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ests. 140 Despite the request, Cook signed University of Texas
quarterback Vince Young to a client representation agreement. 14'
The Tennessee Titans drafted Young third overall, while the Den-
ver broncos drafted Cutler eleventh overall. 142 It is unclear how
Cook could effectively represent both players, as they were vying to
be drafted from the same pool of teams.
43
Moreover, in another situation involving conflicts, David Dunn
committed another unethical action in the representation of his cli-
ents in addition to poaching them from his former partner. Here,
Dunn egregiously ignored the interests of his client, Kellen Clem-
ens.144 In the 2006 NFL Draft, the New York Jets selected Clemens
in the second round. 145 In three seasons with the team, Clemens
had yet to permanently procure the starting quarterback job.14 6 Af-
ter serving as the backup to veteran quarterbacks Chad Pennington
and then Brett Favre, it seemed that 2009 would finally be Clemens'
opportunity to become the Jets regular starter.147 Then, on April
25, 2009, the New YorkJets made a trade with the Cleveland Browns
in order to secure the fifth overall pick in the NFL Draft. 148 With
that selection, the Jets drafted, quarterback, Mark Sanchez.' 49 In-
terestingly, Sanchez and Clemens are both represented by the same
attorney-agent, David Dunn, "that could [create] a potentially sticky
situation when Dunn is negotiating Sanchez's contract, playing one
client against the other."'150
140. See id. (noting specific requests and rationales of agent by player.)
141. See id. (elaborating on possible conflicts of interests for agent represent-
ing multiple players).
142. See NFL.com, supra note 138 (detailing 2006 NFL draft class).
143. See generally, Neiman, supra note 121, at 11 (discussing ethical difficulties
experienced by agents representing multiple players).
144. See Darren Heitner, David Dunn Of Athletes First Speaks To SBR, SPORTS
AGENT BLOc, May 8, 2009, http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2009/05/08/david-
dunn-of-athletes-first-speaks-to-sbr/ (demonstrating how agent was confronted
with and "dodged" questions about conflict of interest).
145. See NFL.com, supra note 138 (detailing 2006 NFL draft class).
146. See NewYorkJets.com, New York Jets Kellen Clemens Team Roster, http://
www.newyorkjets.com/team/player/1073-kellen-clemens (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (showing that Kellen Clemens has played in fourteen games for New York
Jets, three of which, he started).
147. See Mark Cannizzaro, Clemens Can't Catch Break With Jets, N.Y. POST, May 8,
2009, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/sports/jets/clemenscan catch
breakwithjetsawDBgx4GtvZH9LAPzGBSZP (chronicling troubles of profes-
sional quarter-back).
148. See id. (detailing draft day moves of New York Jets in 2009).
149. See id. (discussing New York Jets selection of rookie quarterback).
150. See Associated Press, Clemens Appreciated Sanchez Gesture, ESPN.coM, http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4150065 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (sug-
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Furthermore, it is part of an agent's job to ensure that a client
is drafted as high as possible. 151 An agent helps develop the buzz
around a player.1 52 The higher the player is drafted, the more lu-
crative his contract.1 53 In the Clemens-Sanchez instance, not only is
one agent representing two clients on the same roster, but also two
quarterback clients who are vying to be the starter!1 54 When does
representing one client take away from zealous advocacy on behalf
of another? Not only are players contracted through a finite pool
of money, but also, in this instance, only one of the players can win
the starting quarterback job.155
In conclusion, there are many situations in which an agent can-
not adequately represent two clients, because the interests of the
clients are directly adverse. In these situations, the clients would
benefit from an ethical rule similar to the attorney ethical conflict
rule that forbids an agent to act in these situations. Such a rule
should be created to best protect professional athletes.
2. The Importance of Trust In Agent-Client Relationships
The relationship between athlete and agent is based on
trust. 1 56 Most athletes spend a great deal of time evaluating repre-
sentatives in attempting choose the right one. 157 Unfortunately,
gesting possibility of David Dunn playing one client against another when negotiat-
ing Sanchez's contract).
151. See generally Paul D. Staudohar, So You Want To Be a Sports Agent, LAB. L.J.
(2006) available at http://www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/employee- bene
fits-benefits/4063876-1.html (discussing general goals of sports agents when repre-
senting clients).
152. See id. (noting that functions of sports agents, in general, include pro-
moting athletes career through media coverage and public relations).
153. See NFL.com, Signing Status of 2009 NFL Draft First-Round Picks, http://
www.nfl.com/draft/story?id=09000d5d810d9ec2&template=with-video-with-com-
ments&confirm=true (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (providing details of contracts
signed by 2009 NFL first round draft picks).
154. See id. (asserting challenges and potential conflicts associated with
represen-ting two similar clients).
155. See Neiman, supra note 121, at 11 (discussing conflict arising when agents
represent clients competing for "finite" resources).
156. See ROBERT H. RuXIN, AN ATHLETE's GuIDE TO AGENTS 126 (Ind. Univ.
Press 4th ed. 2004) (noting that successful client-agent relationships involve client
placing trust in agent, and agent earning trust).
157. See NCAA.org, Questions to Ask Prospective Agents, http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaa/legislation+and+governance/eligibility+and+recruit-
ing/agents+and+amateurism/resources/agent-questions.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (posing useful questions to ask agent during selection process).
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sometimes vetting is not enough and athletes often find themselves
misguided, misled and defrauded. 58
Picking the wrong agent can adversely affect the rest of an ath-
lete's life, wasting the athlete's life's work and earnings and threat-
ening his family's welfare. For example, one agent named Richard
Sorkin who could not properly manage his clients' affairs greatly
damaged their careers and finances. Sorkin was a sportswriter
turned non-attorney agent who represented more than fifty NHL
and NBA players in the 1970s. 159 Sorkin "squandered an estimated
$1.2 million of his clients' money, much of it on his own gambling
and stock market ventures."160 In 1978, Sorkin pleaded guilty to
seven counts of grand larceny and was sentenced to three years in
prison) 61 Sorkin is not alone, as he is just one among a number of
agents who have utilized a position of trust with their clients in or-
der to bilk millions of dollars from the client.162
In other cases, conflicts with agents result in lawsuits, as was the
case with late Hall of Fame NFL player, Reggie White, who spent
eight years as a defensive end for the Philadelphia Eagles. 16- Dur-
ing his time with the Eagles, non-attorney agent Patrick Forte repre-
sented White. 164 While Forte was negotiating a new contract
between White and the Eagles, he was also negotiating on his own
behalf to become an assistant to Eagles' president, Harry Gam-
ble.1 65 White filed suit in U.S. District Court seeking $1.5 million
from Forte. 166 White alleged Forte neglected to tell him about an
158. See Associated Press, Legislature Aims to Protect Student Athletes, ESPN.coM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=1878699 (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (outlining government actions taken to combat unscrupulous agent
activity).
159. See Neff, supra note 12 (highlighting financial distress between agents
and clients).
160. See id. (advising legal troubles of agent who misused clients' money). Ad-
ditionally, investigations revealed that Sorkin spent $100,000 per week to bet on
baseball, football, and horse races. Id.
161. See id. (disclosing legal ramifications of agents' actions).
162. See id. (revealing that illegal activities of agents have become more com-
monplace and less "shocking" over time).
163. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 79 (discussing player's lawsuit
against agent); see also Pro Football Hall of Fame, Reggie White, http://www.profoot
ballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?PLAYERID=257 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (list-
ing Reggie White statistics and career highlights).
164. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 79 (laying foundation of
lawsuit).
165. See id. at 79-80. (addressing possible conflicts of interest precipitating
lawsuit).
166. See RAY DIDINGER AND ROBERT S. LYONS, THE EAGLES ENCYCLOPEDIA 95
(Temple Univ. Press 2005) (documenting history of player's lawsuit against agent).
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option year on his contract. 167 White charged that Forte "pursued
his [Forte's] employment with the Eagles at the same time that he
was ostensibly representing the best interests of White." 168 The suit
was later dropped after White was able to come to a contract agree-
ment with the Eagles, but his relationship with the team was irrepa-
rably cracked. 169 In 1993, this fissure came to a head when White
left the Eagles as a free agent to join the Green Bay Packers. 170
William "Tank" Black is another example of a non-attorney
sports agent who allowed greed and unethical behavior to interfere
with the job he was hired to perform. 17' Black was certified as a
player-agent with both the NFL and NBA.1 72 Yet, he misappropri-
ated more than $14 million from his clients.' 73 Black was convicted
in Florida of fraud, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice charges,
for which he spent five years in prison. 174 One of Black's clients,
Fred Taylor, was drafted ninth by the Jacksonville Jaguars in the
1998 NFL Draft.1 75 Taylor selected Black because of his ability to
work with people and foster personal relationships. 176 At Black's
trial, Taylor, who had been swindled out of his $5 million signing
bonus, sat on the witness stand crying, "I agreed with everything he
said . . . I trusted him with my life, with my daughter's life. 17 7
Black abused the position of trust and confidence that he enjoyed
with his clients and acted as an unregistered investment adviser and
unregistered broker-dealer, in violation of regulations promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 178
167. See id. (noting allegations involved in player's lawsuit against agent).
168. Id.
169. See Associated Press, Sports People: Football; Pact For White, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1989, at B10 available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/O8/22/sports/sports-
people-football-pact-for-white.html (discussing effect lawsuit had on player's rela-
tionship with team).
170. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIs, supra note 5, at 79 (discussing career moves of
player); see also Pro Football Hall of Fame, supra note 163 (listing Reggie White's
career highlights).
171. See Staudohar, supra note 151 (highlighting highly publicized cases of
agent misconduct).
172. See id. (mentioning William "Tank" Black's qualifications as agent).
173. See Davis, supra note 54, at 784 (referencing cases of agent misconduct).
174. See id. (providing result of criminal charges).
175. See Gene Collier, Gene Therapy: Tank's For the Bad Memory, PIrSBURGH
POST GAZETrE, May 3, 2002, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/sports/col-
umnists/20020503gene4.asp. (developing professional relationship between Fred
Taylor and William "Tank" Black).
176. See id. (suggesting William "Tank" Black was also highly regarded finan-
cial investor).
177. Id.
178. See United States v. William H. Black, et al., Release No. 17511, No.
1:00CR15 SPM (N.D. Fla, May 8, 2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation /
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If consistent professional rules of conduct were in place for
sports agents, there would be set ethical standards to which every
player representative would be held. 79 With sports being a multi-
billion dollar industry, agents must be held more accountable in
order to protect athletes' best interests. 180 Bad business advice may
leave an athlete unprepared to wisely invest the money he or she
has earned during his or her playing days, money that in many
cases must last for the duration of the athlete's life. 181 Several states
have passed legislation to require agent registration.' 82 Enforce-
ment by states, however, has been "uneven and unpredictable."'183
Agent regulation continues to be a business and legal
battleground.184
B. Negotiating Styles, Nice vs. Ruthless
Although attorney-agents are arguably held to a higher stan-
dard than non attorney-agents, because of their mandatory adher-
ence to the ABA's ethics code, there are still two very distinct
approaches when lawyer-agents represent athletes. Both yield re-
sults, but only one approach actively seeks long-term collaborative
relationships between agents and teams. The other is a more ag-
gressive short-term, adversarial approach. In this section, these two
approaches are contrasted. After analyzing these two styles, one
can see why professional sports all need an overarching set of ethi-
cal rules to regulate their agents and arguably, why these rules
should perhaps be even more extensive than attorney ethical rules.
litreleases/lr17511.htm (detailing sentencing and restitution orders against Wil-
liam "Tank" Black as punishment for investment schemes).
179. See SHROPSHIRE & DAvIs, supra note 5, at 144-48 (discussing options for
regulating sports agents).
180. See id. (stressing need to hold agents accountable for actions).
181. See Delevingne, supra note 52 (discussing ways athletes mis-use money
without proper guidance).
182. See DoVcE COTTON AND JOHN T. WOLOHAN, LAW FOR RECREATION AND
SPORT MANAGERS 657 (Kendall Hunt Publ'g Co. 2003) (listing regulations imposed
by states). A number of states now regulate the activities of sports agent. Id. A
problem arises; however, because most state regulations are vague and vary consid-
erably from state to state. Id. This lack of uniformity has limited the number of
sports agents who actually register in each state. Id. An agent who intends to do
business in a large number of states may find himself trying to comply with 30
different sets of registration requirements and regulatory schemes. Id.
183. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIs, supra note 5, at 142 (addressing impact of
agency statutes and problems with regulation). Major problems with agency regu-
lation include a "pervasive lack of enforcement in some states," and "apathy toward
the lack of registration by popular sports agents." Id.
184. See id. at vii (discussing business and legal "aspects that impact sports
agents.").
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The examples below will show that even though attorneys have pro-
fessional rules, there are cases where attorney-agents act unethically
in the sports arena and there is no on-point rule that sanctions
them. Therefore, even though attorney-agents are more regulated
than non-attorney agents, greater steps need to be taken to create
sports-focused regulations.
1. Ron Shapiro: The Power of Nice
Ron Shapiro, a cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School,
has been a sports agent for more than thirty years.18 5 In 1995, he
founded the Shapiro Negotiations Institute, designed to teach the
art of negotiation, how to deal with difficult people, and how to
enhance listening skills.'8 6 Shapiro has represented a number of
Hall of Fame MLB clients, including Eddie Murray, Jim Palmer,
Kirby Puckett, Cal Ripken, Jr., and Brooks Robinson.18 7
Unlike some of his fellow agents, Shapiro does not go into con-
tract negotiations looking to go to war.' 88 He has been successful
because of his "be nice without being soft" negotiating style.189 In
1999, when MLB umpires were uncomfortable with the hardball
tactics employed by their union leaders, they turned to Shapiro for
help.' 90 In addition, Shapiro was contacted when the San Antonio
Spurs, a National Basketball Association team, encountered diffi-
cult contract negotiations with players. 19' Shapiro feels there is a
benefit to building long-lasting relationships and helping both sides
achieve what they want.192
185. See Ronald M. Shapiro Biography, http://www.shapironegotiations.com/
bioShapiro.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (outlining agent's qualifications and
experience).
186. See id. (detailing agent's skills and experience).
187. See RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A.JANKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE. How
To NEGOTIATE So EVERYONE WINS - ESPECIALLY YOU! (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
1998) (discussing negotiating style and listing clients).
188. See id. at 230 (discussing disadvantages to aggressive negotiating).
189. Jeff Barker, Negotiations Training Is Agent's Secret, BALT. SUN, Oct. 10, 2005,
at DI.
190. See Murray Chass, Phillips's Opponents Plan a Replacement Union for Umpires,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1999, at D4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/
13/sports/baseball-phillips-s-opponents-plan-a-replacement-union-for-umpires.
html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (explaining that Ron Shapiro will negotiate new la-
bor agreement with Major League Baseball if Richie Phillips is replaced); see also
Barker, supra note 189 (stating umpires summoned Shapiro to find remedy in la-
bor agreement).
191. See Barker, supra note 189 (discussing when Shapiro was used to face
difficult player contracts by San Antonio Spurs).
192. See SHAPIRO & JANKowSKI, supra note 187, at 229-31 (explaining that
building relationships is necessary for superior negotiating).
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In addition, Shapiro goes to the negotiating table prepared
and able to support his contract requests. In negotiating a contract
between Brooks Robinson and the Baltimore Orioles, Shapiro read,
dug, scoured, researched, referenced, and cross-referenced in or-
der to learn everything he could about the Orioles. 193 Shapiro be-
lieves that with preparation, it is possible for both sides to emerge
from negotiations as winners, and has stated that, "If all you have in
your toolbox is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail.
The same holds true for negotiation. More tools enable you to solve
more problems. 1 94
Further, when an agent is able to build a long-term relation-
ship with team management, the two sides are likely to return to
the negotiating table with other athletes.' 95 Shapiro believes that
effective negotiating develops relationships, which will lead to more
deals. "If you burn bridges, destroy the other side, squeeze the last
buck out, 'take no prisoners,' you can't expect the other party to
want to do business with you again. They'll run from the negotiat-
ing table, let alone consider returning to it."196 To Shapiro, negoti-
ation is not a zero sum game, in which one side has to win and the
other side loses. 197 "The success rate [for win-lose negotiations] is
about as good as that of war - seldom and rarely long-lasting.... 198
Similarly, Shapiro believes that if you have gradually developed
a relationship with the other party, you are going to look for ways to
move beyond a deadlock.' 99 If you reach an impasse with a party,
with whom you do not have a relationship, however, you are "more
193. See id. at 69-75 (portraying negotiating strategy used to help Brooks
Robinson).
194. See id. at 5 (identifying tools necessary in negotiating).
195. See id. at 229-31 (detailing why building relationships works when
negotiating).
196. Id. at 230.
197. See id. at 27 (analyzing why win-lose negotiations do not work during
sports agent negotiations); see also Game Theory, ECONOMIST.COM, Nov. 24, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/management/displaystory.cfm?story
id=12669299 (discussing game theory, a form of business negotiations based on
economic theories which focus on consequences of choices).
"Zero sum" situations are those where ... [T]here is no incentive to
co-operate with opponents because every inch given to them is an inch
lost. The idea of the zero-sum game is modified by the introduction of
the possibility of change in the nature of the game while it is being
played. Hence, for instance, companies that are fighting for market share
are playing a zero-sum game if they see that market as fixed. But if the
market is continually ... the players are playing a game in which they can
have a declining share of a bigger cake and still see their businesses grow.
Id.
198. SHAPIRO &JANKOWSKI, supra note 187, AT 27.
199. See id. at 231 (explaining importance of relationships and bonding).
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likely to let the impasse stand."200 "Every negotiation takes place in
an environment .... It means the feelings, sensitivities, tensions,
fears, and hopes that comprise the atmosphere of negotiation.
They make up the environment as much, or moreso, [sic] than the
four walls, table, and chairs."20 1 Strong, respectful relationships
can accomplish what mere acquaintanceships cannot.
Shapiro's relationship with his client, Cal Ripken, has lasted
since Ripken was a teenager because Shapiro treats Ripken with
consideration, and tries to meet his real needs.20 2 When Cal
Ripken was an up-and-coming baseball player, at the young age of
eighteen, many agents sought to represent him.203 These agents
promised Ripken that they could get him to the big leagues faster,
get him more endorsements, or get him more money.20 4 They took
him to fancy dinners and drove him around in limousines in order
to try to persuade Ripken to hire them.20 5 Ron Shapiro's approach
with Ripken differed from that of the other agents. 20 6 Rather than
trying to catch his eye with expensive gifts and a fancy lifestyle, Sha-
piro merely invited Ripken to his office. 207 Instead of promising
him the moon, Shapiro listened to what Ripken wanted and
needed. 208 Ripken, in turn, has spoken quite highly of Shapiro, say-
ing that with an agent like Shapiro, "[m] ake no mistake, you'll out-
negotiate the other side."20 9 While Ripken acknowledges that many
agents are "sharks," he proudly stands behind Ron Shapiro, pro-
claiming that he is not one of those agents.210
Shapiro's negotiating techniques and treatment of his clients
demonstrate that treating your client like an equal and a friend can
win more clients than treating him like a prize to be won, and that
treating your opponent as an equal, as opposed to an opponent in
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at v (explaining genesis of Ripken's relationship with Shapiro at
the time when Ripken first started playing baseball).
203. See id. at v (discussing typical agents and tactics they use to recruit
clients).
204. See id. (describing what agents would typically offer Ri4 ken to persuade
him to be represented by them).
205. See id. at v-vi (listing tactics that agents would use to recruit clients).
206. See id. at vi (saying how Shapiro differs from other agents because he
does not use glitz and glamour to attract clients).
207. See id. (mentioning how Shapiro began his relationship with Ripken at
his office).
208. See id. (distinguishing Shapiro from other agents based on his ability to
listen to clients).
209. Id. at v-vi (stereotyping agents).
210. See id. at v (detailing Ripken's views on Shapiro).
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war, helps establish relationships with clients. 211 In a "money talks,"
everything-is-a-sales-pitch world, Shapiro's techniques indicate that
the money, glitz, and glamour are not everything.212 He shows that
personal relationships, respect, and money and career manage-
ment are the key to success and longevity in a usually fleeting
profession. 213
2. Drew Rosenhaus: Proud to Be a Shark
Smarmy, arrogant, deceitful, a "cancer, a low life" these are
some of the adjectives that have been used to describe NFL attor-
ney-agent Drew Rosenhaus.214 As a twenty-two-year-old graduate of
the Duke University School of Law, Rosenhaus became the young-
est certified NFL agent. 215 He works tirelessly for his clients. 2 16 He
has negotiated over one billion dollars in player contracts. 217 Other
sports agents, however, are irritated that "Rosenhaus is the brash
public face of the business."218
Unlike Shapiro, Rosenhaus's professional success has resulted
from employing a take-no-prisoners negotiation style. 21 9
Rosenhaus openly describe himself as a shark, and he even owns
and keeps a pet shark in his office. 220 The agent described the asso-
ciation between his style and the nature of sharks, saying, "A shark
is a relentless predator that is goal-oriented and focused on its ob-
jective around the clock .... It never rests, it never wavers, it is
always on the clock. That's how we are." 2 21
211. For a further discussion about Shapiro's practices, see supra notes 193-
201 and accompanying text.
212. See SHAPIRo &JANKOWSKI, supra note 187, at v-vii (discussing relationship
between Ripken and Shapiro).
213. See id. (discussing Shapiro's successful relationship with Ripken).
214. See Allen Wilson, Agent Provocateur, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 4, 2003, at D1,
available at http://www.prosportsgroup.com/SportsAgentNews/Oct2OO3/News/
rosen haus.htm (discussing how people perceive Drew Rosenhaus's negotiating
style); see also Coates supra note 75 (discussing perception of Rosenhaus); see also
HBO Real Sports With Bryant Gumble: Drew Rosenhaus (Revisited) (HBO television
broadcast July 26, 2005) (updating profile of Rosenhaus, with respect to contro-
versy with Philadelphia Eagles and Terrell Owens).
215. See Rosenhaus Sports, Recent News, http://www.rosenhaussports.com/
home.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (providing background of Drew Rosenhaus).
216. See id. (discussing services Rosenhaus offers).
217. See id. (explaining that Rosenhaus works tirelessly to show clients "the
money").
218. See Coates, supra note 75 (quoting other agents' opinions of Rosenhaus).
219. See Wilson, supra note 214 (discussing negotiation approach of
Rosenhaus).
220. See id. (discussing negotiating style of Rosenhaus).
221. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Rosenhaus has been accused of falsifying information and ly-
ing to improve his negotiation position; however, the NFL has
never investigated Rosenhaus. 222 Former NFL attorney-agent Tim
Irwin has said on separate occasions that "There is a cancer growing
in our profession . . ." and that he would not permit Rosenhaus to
represent his son. 223 Veteran NFL attorney-agent David Ware has
also derided Rosenhaus' tactics, stating that "Drew tells a player that
he's worth more money, that his agent is not doing enough for
him, that he's better than the guy starting in front of him. Now the
player is not only mad at his agent, he's mad at the team manage-
ment. He sees the guy sitting in front of him as a co-
conspirator."2 24
Rosenhaus would do almost anything to gain a competitive ad-
vantage over his fellow agents. 225 One of Rosenhaus's more criti-
cized stunts came during the 2003 NFL draft with University of
Miami running back Willis McGahee. 226 McGahee was projected as
a top-five draft pick before tearing knee ligaments in the Fiesta
Bowl. 22 7 With McGahee's draft prospects quickly slipping, and
before a national television audience, McGahee's phone rang
shortly before the end of the first round.228 Rosenhaus was on the
other end of the line, not a member of an NFL team intent on
drafting McGahee. 229 This was a ploy to make teams believe that
other teams were interested in McGahee. Since all of the other
222. See id. (discussing allegations raised against Rosenhaus but never
investigated).
223. See id. (discussing Irwin's perception of Rosenhaus).
224. Michael Bamberger & Don Yaeger, So, Sue Me! His No-Hold-Barred Tactics
Infuriate NFL Executives, But Drew Rosenhaus, the Self-Styled Dark Knight of Sports Agents,
Isn't About to Apologize, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 15, 1996, at 84.
225. See Wilson, supra note 214 (discussing business style of Rosenhaus).
Rosenhaus, for his part, believes that his aggressive business style garners him at-
tention because it is so successful. See id.
226. See Associate Press, Rosenhaus Admits to McGahee-Related Media Manipula-
tion, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Apr. 28, 2003, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
football/2003/draft/news/2003/04/27/mcgaheeagent tap/ (discussing
Rosenhaus's stunt to get Willis McGahee drafted).
227. See id. (explaining background on Willis McGahee); see also Charlie
Nobles, After Surgery, McGahee Opts for the N.F.L. Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at
D2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/15/sports/pro-football-after-
surgery-mcg-ahee-opts-for-the-nfl-draft.html (mentioning McGahee as top-five
draft pick); see also Damon Hack, McGahee Hopes to Allay Concerns Before Draft, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003 at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/22/
sports/pro-football-mcgahee-hopes-to-allay-concerns-before-draft.html (discussing
McGahee's need to prove his health after injury to NFL teams).
228. See Associated Press, supra note 226 (discussing events of draft including
phone call).
229. See id. (discussing Rosenhaus's use of draft day tactics to boost Mc-
Gahee's prospects).
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team administrations saw McGahee take the call they assumed an-
other team was calling him.230 McGahee was selected by the Buf-
falo Bills with the twenty-third pick of the draft.2 31 Rosenhaus's
adversaries said "such tactics destroy an agent's credibility . . . the
best deals are made on mutual trust, not deception."23 2 Rosenhaus,
however, claims that "[t]he perception was manipulated to help
Willis as much as I could."233
Still, Rosenhaus prides himself on the personal touch and de-
votion he offers all his clients. 234 He does not think there is any-
thing wrong with the way he represents his clients, and there are no
rules that forbid most of the representation tactics he uses. He
does not employ a secretary and Rosenhaus personally or his
brother Jason, who is also a certified NFL agent, always answers his
phones. 235 He is ready to play hardball at a moment's notice; as he
has two cell phones on him at all times and the numbers of all NFL
general managers on speed dial. 23 6 He works seven days a week,
nineteen hours per day. 2 3 7 He is not married, has no children, and
does not take vacations. 238 According to former Buffalo Bills' offen-
sive guardJamie Nails, "Drew treats his clients in a first-class fashion
.... He cares and he's always there when you need him."2 39
Rosenhaus has, however, received criticism for encouraging
players to hold out of training camp when trying to renegotiate a
230. See id. (stating reasoning for Rosenhaus's phone call).
231. See id. (stating draft day events and noting position where Willis Mc-
Gahee was drafted).
232. Wilson, supra note 214 (discussing negative perception of Rosenhaus by
other agents in response to draft day tactics).
233. Associated Press, supra note 226.
234. See Rosenhaus Sports, supra note 215 (stating commitment Rosenhaus
has for his clients).
235. See Greg Garber, Rosenhaus' Success Draws Cries of Foul Play, ESPN.coM,
June 7, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=garber-
greg&id=2072819&num=0 (discussing Rosenhaus' style of negotiation and of run-
ning his business).
236. See Clifton Brown, The Agent Nonplayers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2005, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/sports/football/24
rosenhaus.html?pagewanted=print (discussing Rosenhaus's business style).
237. See id. (discussing Rosenhaus's dedication and work ethic); see also Mark
Maske, Owens's Agent Is A Paper Tiger: Rosenhaus Wants To Change NFL, WASH. POST,
Aug. 1, 2005, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080100013.html (noting Rosenhaus's daily work
hours). Rosenhaus' days are not only long, but frenetic; he is constantly juggling
phone calls and negotiations. Id.
238. See Brown, supra note 236 (discussing Rosenhaus's personal life).
239. Wilson, supra note 214.
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contract.2 40 According to Rosenhaus, "When a player outperforms
his contract, why is it not okay for him to get a readjustment in his
favor?" 24 1 In his view, since a team can cut a player at any time and
not owe him the remainder of his contract, a player should be able
to better his financial position after good performance. 242
Rosenhaus does not see himself as a difficult negotiator, and has
stated, "I want to be viewed as a guy who can make a deal. Once I
get what's fair, I pull the trigger."243 Rosenhaus thinks that teams
can play hardball as well as an agent can. His portfolio of contracts
shows that his negotiation tactics, while not always admired, do
yield results.
However, for all the success Rosenhaus has enjoyed in his ca-
reer, his brash negotiation tactics have caused him to have great
missteps. One of his clients, Errict Rhett, was a running back for
the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. 24 4 He was unhappy with the $336,000
he was set to earn during the 1996 NFL season.2 45 Under
Rosenhaus's advice, Rhett sat out the first ninety-three days of the
season, hoping to secure a more lucrative contract from the Buc-
caneers.24 6 During training camp he rejected a six-year, $14.1 mil-
lion contract.2 47 When Rhett finally ended his holdout, rather than
have a new contract, he had a bill for $5,000 per day in fines; this
came out to $465,000.248 Instead of being paid to play, Rhett found
himself owing the Buccaneers $129,000.249 Rosenhaus lost a client,
and Rhett irreparably damaged his career and reputation.
In conclusion, while Rosenhaus' brash negotiation tactics with
his opponents often get his clients what they want, team administra-
tions and the teams themselves often leave these negotiations with
negative feelings toward the player. 25 0 Unlike Shapiro, who brings
240. See ROBERT H. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO AGENTS 84 (Indiana Uni-
versity Press 2004) (1982) (discussing generally process of holding out in contract
negotiations).
241. Maske, supra note 237, at 3.
242. See id. (explaining Rosenhaus's reasoning regarding outperformance).
243. Brown, supra note 236.
244. See Bryan Burwell, Rhett's Holdout Turns Out to Be Big Bucks Mistake, USA
TODAY, Oct. 25, 1996, at C12 (stating background on Errict Rhett).
245. See id. (explaining reason for new contract negotiation).
246. See id. (discussing tactic used in negotiation).
247. See id. (mentioning what contracts he rejected that caused him to sit
out).
248. See id. (noting fines entailed with sitting out).
249. See id. (explaining result of Errict Rhett sitting out).
250. See Garber, supra note 235. Quoting a Rosenhaus associate as saying:
He's left a bloody swath of hurt feelings in his path .... Sure, he works
his ass off, but he's crossed the line. A year ago, he decided his ambition
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teams together, Rosenhaus tears them apart by making players the
opponents of their coaches and fellow players, pulling money away
from other players or separating his player from the other players
through preferential treatment, etc. 25 1 Rosenhaus automatically
brings an environment of animosity with him when he steps into
any negotiating room, an animosity he either consciously or sub-
consciously passes onto his clients. 252 Besides creating tension
amongst teams, Rosenhaus' tactics are often risky, sometimes leav-
ing his promising clients with nothing.253 Unfortunately, when
these players are left with no money and no career prospects, they
are often left with the bad reputation that Rosenhaus has passed
onto them.254
Therefore, while Rosenhaus can get his "big" clients the "big"
money, he carries with him the potential to ruin an athlete's career
and reputation. 255 His tactics are extreme and create extreme re-
sults of either getting the most possible or getting nothing. 256 He
does not have the consistency that men such as Shapiro have, and
this is his one big weakness. 257 For all of his strength and successes,
he fails to deliver to all of his clients the services that he promised
them.2 58 Rosenhaus' negotiating style prevents him from doing an-
would know no bounds - that he'd target every star in his grasp. As the
practice grew, he said to himself, I'm going for it. I'm going to be the
king. He's Colonel Kurtz stepping off his boat in Heart of Darkness. He's
become megalomaniacal, consumed by greed.
Id. (quotations omitted).
251. See id. (stating that Rosenhaus' dealings with Terrell Owens while re-
ceiver for Philadelphia Eagles and Javon Walker while receiver for Green Bay Pack-
ers have "caused friction" with their respective teams after both players missed off-
season camps to renegotiate contracts).
252. See id. (describing Rosenhaus as "both admired and resented" because
many agents lose clients to him).
253. See id. (quoting general manager of the Tennessee Titans, Floyd Reese
who says Rosenhaus is "not afraid to let his players try free agency, because he's
confident he can get them a good deal" even though can be risky) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
254. See Maske, supra note 237 (explaining how public perceives players, such
as Terrell Owens, who already have contracts but want to renegotiate for more
money).
255. See Burwell, supra note 244 (describing Tampa Bay Buccanneer Errict
Rhett's 93-day hold-out after rejecting $14.1 million, six-year contract as "really big,
gigantic, jumbo, super-sized mistake" influenced by Rosenhaus) (emphasis
deleted).
256. See id. (noting that after hold-out, Rhett was left owing Buccaneers
$129,000 in fines).
257. For a further discussion of Shapiro's approach as agent, see supra notes
185-213 and accompanying text.
258. See Burwell, supra note 244 ("unless Rosenhaus lands Rhett a substan-
tially better deal than was previously negotiated last summer, Rhett wasted his time
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ything else, however he risks the consequences of his miscalcula-
tions and poor behavior.259
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGENT MISCALCULATIONS
AND POOR BEHAVIOR
Many athletes blindly accept their agents' advice, thinking that
the agent is only looking out for their best interests, not realizing
the agents other possible self concerns such as pride, image and
money. These clients are often young and do not realize the possi-
ble damage that an agent can do. Additionally, many athletes act in
the moment, not anticipating the possible future repercussions or
rash or selfish behavior.
For a young and inexperienced athlete, an agent is a key figure
in the transition from being an amateur to a professional.2 60 "The
athlete-agent relationship is typically one of unequal power: the
agent dominates the athlete, who is completely dependent on the
agent for business advice. '2 61 A young athlete is unprepared to
make his own negotiations and often makes decisions about who
will represent him based on nothing more than faith because he is
unable to distinguish one agent's abilities from another's.262
National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing ("NASCAR")
driver Kyle Busch learned a tough lesson at a young age that not all
agents are sufficiently forthright with their clients.263 Busch was ne-
gotiating a contract extension with Hendrick Motorsports.2 64 His
attorney-agent, Allen Miller, "kept him in the dark" about how the
negotiation process was going, while the process was going badly.2 65
Before he knew it, Busch was pushed out of Hendrick Motorsports
sitting out . . . [s]omehow, though, I suspect Rosenhaus will still get his
commission.").
259. See Maske, supra note 237 (saying that Rosenhaus "isn't married and has
no hobbies"); Clifton Brown, supra note 236 ("I literally work seven days a week,
I'm not married, I have no kids, I don't take vacations.").
260. See Edward Vincent King,Jr., Views of Sport: Do Agents Help or Hurt?; Depen-
dency Leads to Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989, sec. 8 at 9, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/1989/03/05/sports/views-of-sport-do-agents-help-or-hurt-depen-
dency-leads-to-abuse.html (explaining how athletes' need for agents makes them
vulnerable).
261. Id.
262. See id. (stating that reasons athletes rely on agents are same reasons
agents can take advantage of athletes).
263. See David Newton, Agent Keeps Kyle Busch in Dark During Contract Extension
Talks, ESPN.coM, June 15, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/rpm/news/story?
seriesld=2&id=2905784 (discussing Busch being kept in dark during negotiations).
264. See id. (providing background of Kyle Busch's contract negotiations).
265. See id. (discussing how Kyle Bush felt of his agent's style of negotiating
his contract).
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in favor of fellow driver Dale Earnhardt, Jr.26 6 His agent dimin-
ished the number of racing groups that were interested in Busch's
services through his hardball tactics and left Busch "very ignorant";
now not only did Busch not have a contract but he also had no clue
what was going on.26 7
Another possible example of bad agent advice and negotiating
involves former MLB player Juan Gonzalez. 268 In 2000, Gonzalez
turned down an eight-year, $140 million contract with the Detroit
Tigers. 269 Once known as 'Juan Gone" for his power hitting, fans
and commentators were left asking "where has Juan Gone?" 270
Whether it was the team, contract terms, or some other variable
that led Gonzalez to reject the Tigers' offer, only Gonzalez knows.
After turning down the Detroit contract, Gonzalez signed a one-
year deal with the Cleveland Indians to prove he was still one of
baseball's best players. 2 71 After a string of injuries and bad luck,
Gonzalez never again played to his potential and he never came
close to achieving a $140 million deal.2 72 Perhaps Gonzalez did not
like Detroit and did not like the direction of the team. Gonzalez's
attorney-agent, Scott Boras, said that Juan Gonzalez will turn down
money in order to play in a place he wants to be, and he risk a lot to
do so.2 73
In 2007, New York Yankees third baseman, Alex Rodriguez, in-
furiated fans, coaches, fellow players, and MLB executives when,
under the advisement of agent Scott Boras, he opted out of his
Yankees contract during the pivotal Game Four of the World Se-
ries. 274 By using the championship-clinching game to announce his
266. See id. (explaining events that took place in negotiations).
267. See id. (showing result caused by agent).
268. SeeJorge L. Ortiz, At 37,Juan Gonzalez Is Still Searching For One More Shot at
the Major Leagues, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday. com/
sports/baseball/2007-02-07juan-x.htm (describing Gonzalez's ongoing contract
negotiations).
269. See id. (stating that Gonzalez turned down contract and has no regrets).
270. See id. (discussing current perception of Juan Gonzalez after missing
large number of games).
271. See Associated Press, Gonzalez, Indians Reach 1 Year Deal, PITTSBURGH POST
GAZErE, Jan. 10, 2001 at C3 (describing one-year deal with Cleveland Indians).
272. See Juan Gonzalez, Baseball Reference.com, http://www.baseball-refer-
ence. com/players/g/gonzaju03.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (displaying Gon-
zalez's statistics which illustrate he was not as successful as in 1990s and showing
Gonzalez's salary each season which was never higher than $13,000,000).
273. See Juan Gonzalez Signs with Indians, Rangerfans.com http://www.
ranger fans.com/archives/2001/01/juan-gonzalez-signs-with-india.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2009) (discussing Boras' impression of Gonzalez).
274. See Associated Press, A-Rod's Mid-Game Opt-Out Angers MLB, NBC SPORTS
ONLINE, Oct. 29, 2007, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/21495045/ (explaining
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intentions, Rodriguez "put his selfish interests and that of one indi-
vidual player above the overall good of the game." 275 The fallout
from the Boras-advised publicity stunt left Rodriguez feeling foolish
and questioning the relationship with his longtime agent.276 Rodri-
guez decided that he ultimately wanted to return to the Yankees
and headed to the negotiating table solo.2 77 Rodriguez was able to
negotiate a new contract with the Yankees for ten years and $275
million.278
Because of the fears associated with agents, some athletes are
again meeting with management one-on-one in order to get the
best possible deal.279 Negotiating for oneself also eliminates the
hefty commissions paid to agents. Former University of Maryland
basketball great Len Elmore noted:
In an environment where agents must constantly restate their
value proposition, a majority of agents are going to be hard-pressed
to prove fairly and comparatively how they enhance a player's bot-
tom line or his overall career .... The day has come when super-
stars can meet face-to-face with an activist owner and without an
agent reach the basics of an agreement. 280
However, this perspective seems too drastic, as it ignores the
possible benefits an agent can bring to an athlete. Perhaps a better
solution is hiring an attorney on an hourly basis, instead on the
timing of announcement detracted from focus that should have been on Boston
Red Sox and Colorado Rockies who were playing in World Series).
275. Id.
276. See Kate Kelly & Dana Cimilluca, Alex Rodriguez Gets a Surprise Assist From a
Fan in Omaha, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB119526835344296733.html (explaining Rodriquez wanted to remain with
Yankees and risked negative results with Union by "sidestepping Mr. Boras").
277. See id. (discussing Alex Rodriguez's contract negotiations which involved
assistance from billionaire Warren Buffett and two executives from Goldman Sachs
in order to get back into Yankees' good graces).
278. See Selena Roberts & David Epstein, Sources Tell SI Alex Rodriguez Tested
Positive For Steroids in 2003, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.coM, Feb. 9, 2009, http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/2009/baseball/mlb/02/07/alex-rodriguez-steroids/ (explain-
ing terms between Alex Rodriquez and New York Yankees). Rodriguez's contract
has the ability to reach $305 million if he meets certain milestones. See id. Rodri-
guez can earn a six million dollar bonus when he passes Willie Mays, Babe Ruth,
Hank Aaron and Barry Bonds on the all-time home runs list. See id. If Rodriguez
breaks Barry Bonds' all-time home run record, he earns an additional six million
dollar. See id. In order to collect the bonus money, Rodriguez must make extra
promotional appearances and sign memorabilia for the Yankees as part of a mar-
keting plan. See id.
279. See Len Elmore, Turn Out the Lights, Agents' Party Is Over, SPORTS Bus J.,
July 9, 2001, available at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/in-
dex.cfm?fuseaction= article.preview&articleID=7539 (discussing hardships for
agents today as players negotiate on their own).
280. Karcher, supra note 74 (citing Elmore, supra note 279).
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basis of commission. Prominent players such as NBA basketball
greats Tim Duncan and Grant Hill hire attorneys on an hourly basis
to negotiate contracts, paying thousands of dollars, instead of mil-
lions for legal services. 21 Grant Hill's attorney, Lon Babby,
charged him $100,000 to negotiate his first contract.282 Had he
paid the standard agent commission, Hill would have expended
$1.8 million. 283 As Boston Celtic Ray Allen noted, hiring an attor-
ney on an hourly basis is "merely a good business decision."28 4 This
solution appears to be a good one, and agents would be wise to
note that their careers may be in danger unless they change their
ways and begin to act ethically. An ethical code could help them do
this.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The sports agent industry is largely "devoid of systematically en-
forceable regulations, which truly dictate minimum levels of profes-
sional expertise or accountability."28 5 Sports leagues should enact a
uniform regulation system, such as the American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").286 With no
strict guidelines, the leagues essentially give sports agents un-
restricted power in the way they operate. 287 Leagues could also
benefit by enacting a continuing education program to ensure that
agents are current with regard to the laws and practices of each
league.2 88 Players would be well advised to understand the differ-
281. See SHROPSHIRE & DAvis, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing alternatives to
contingent based agents, including hiring non-agent attorneys who are paid hourly
rate to review contracts).
282. See id. at 23 (noting terms to negotiate first contract for Hill).
283. See id. (illustrating cost effectiveness of hourly paid agents).
284. See id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted) (showing that some ath-
letes believe hiring hourly paid agents is "a good business decision").
285. MarcJ. Kessler, Who Can Best Represent Professional Athletes: Lawyer vs. Non-
Lawyer, COLUMBUS BaR Ass'N J. (2005), available at http://www.peoplesbar.org/
legalresources/Articles/AthleteRepresentation.pdf.
286. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2009), http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mrpc/mrpctoc.html (listing Model Rules); see also Kessler, supra note
285 (contrasting attorney-agents, who are held to profession's ethical standards,
with non-attorney-agents, who are not).
287. See Kessler, supra note 285 ("Although regulatory standards may exist
within a particular players association and there is a certification process, the play-
ers associations do not have the resources . . . to conduct comprehensive moral
character investigations or background checks").
288. See Paul T. Dee, Ethical Aspects of Representing Professional Athletes, 3 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 111, 115 (1992) (listing competence as one of elements regulated by
professional codes, player's associations and state laws).
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ence between attorney and non-attorney representatives. 289 The
NFL now requires a graduate degree before an individual will be
certified as a player agent.290 This added emphasis on education
should serve as a wake-up call to the professional athlete.
Attorneys have the educational background to have a better
understanding of contracts, labor laws and tax ramifications. 291 An
attorney-agent is bound by the Model Rules, and failure to comply
with this code of ethics may result in disciplinary action. 292 This is
not the case for the non-attorney agent. If attorney-agents were
held to the Model Rules when participating in a field traditionally
outside the bounds of law, a client would be better protected with
respect to conflicts of interest. 293
Under Model Rule 1.7, "a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest."294
However, an agent may represent two clients with competing inter-
ests if the client consents, the representation is not prohibited by
law, the parities are not against each other, and the attorney reason-
ably believes that neither client's interests will be compromised as a
result of the dual representation. 295 This would prevent agents
such as David Dunn from representing more than one player, at
one position, on the same team. 296
289. See Kessler, supra note 285 (advising athletes to consider differences be-
tween attorney-agents and non-attorney agents, including education, ethical stan-
dards, and financial security).
290. See Agent Regulations, NFL Players Association, http://www.nflplayers.
com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=233&pid=0&type=l (last visited Oct. 31,
2009) (stating criteria for NFL agents, including graduate degree); see also Agent
Application, National Basketball Player's Association, http://www.nbpa.com/doc-
uments/NBPAAgent Application.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (allowing appli-
cants to list negotiating experience if they have no undergraduate degree).
291. See Kessler, supra note 285 (stating lawyers better able to understand
complex collective bargaining agreements).
292. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 286
(listing rules that must be followed). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
Ducr Rule 8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice Of Law, http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc /rule_8_5.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (showing authority for disci-
plinary action).
293. See Kessler, supra note 285 (explaining that athletes can bring malprac-
tice action against attorney-agents who fail to comply with Model Rules); see also
Dee, supra note 288, at 113 (calling application of professional ethical codes to
professionals acting as sports agents "good policy").
294. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009), http://www.
abanet. org/cpr/mrpc/rule 1_7.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
295. See id. (explaining when conflict of interests may arise).
296. See Darren Heitner, David Dunn of Athletes First Speaks to SBI, SPORT-
sAGENTBLoG.COM, May 8, 2009, http://www.sportsagentblog.com/2009/05/08/
david-dunn-of-athletes-first-speaks-to-sbr/ (noting conflict of interest based on
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Since the same standard of ethics is not applied to the non-
attorney agent as the attorney-agent, attorneys may be quick to cite
unfairness in imposing one standard to them and another to their
non-attorney counterparts. 297 At the time of this article, few courts
have addressed whether an attorney acting as a sports agent is held
to the Model Rules or any other ethical standards that would apply
to an attorney in a traditional legal role. 298 "It may also be argued
that the activities of a sports agent or an attorney may be indistin-
guishable, for which reason it is appropriate to adopt a policy which
supports the application of the ethical code regardless of form." 299
In the absence of an established agents' ethical code, players
may also be wise to retain licensed attorneys on a set fee instead of
unlicensed representatives on a contingent fee. 300 While this may
not be a popular approach with the certified sports agent, a player
with a limited shelf life should welcome the opportunity to save mil-
lions of dollars. 30 1 Moreover, while the player may not longer re-
ceive the lavishing expensive gifts such as cars from their agents, the
reality is, that with the millions of dollars saved by athletes utilizing
an attorney on an hourly basis, the athlete can go out and buy ten
cars. 30 2 30 3 Additionally, for tasks that an athlete feels he or she can-
not handle on his/her own (such as travel arrangements, personal
appearances, etc), the athlete can hire a personal assistant or man-
ager at a fee far less than the commission on a contract.30 4
Dunn's representation of Mark Sanchez and Kellen Clemens, both quarterbacks
for Jets).
297. See Kessler, supra note 285 (stating that lawyers are regulated by Model
Rules while non-lawyers are not).
298. See Dee, supra note 288, at 113 (pointing to In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481,
484 (Ariz. 1978), which held that Model Code applied to attorney acting as finan-
cial advisor).
299. Id. at 112.
300. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 22 (describing benefits of con-
tingency fees).
301. See id. at 23 (analyzing amount of money that athlete can save by hiring
attorney at hourly rate).
302. See Couch, supra note 60, at 120-21 (naming Norby Walters and Lloyd
Bloom as example of agents who have given large gifts, such as "clothing and air-
line tickets," to athletes).
303. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 25-26 (giving example that one
athlete's use of attorney saved him $1.8 million dollars).
304. See Couch, supra note 60, at 112 (listing many roles agents take on for
clients).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A sports agent's job should be to "vigorously safeguard and ad-
vance his client's interest with the undying loyalty of a fiduciary."30 5
Also players, who have a short professional career, need to have an
idea of how to successful move on with their life. However, agents,
who are often more sophisticated in business, usually cultivate the
dependency of the naive young athlete.306 For many agents, once a
client's playing career is over, the agent has no inclination to help a
client with their mundane life activities.30 7
Although most agents do not like Drew Rosenhaus, many rec-
ognize his tremendous talent for negotiating.308 For example, NFL
attorney-agent Mark Bloom filed a grievance with the NFL Players
Association against Rosenhaus for interfering with clients. 30 9 None-
theless, Bloom said, "I can't say I'd necessarily do things the way he
does, but he gets results. His drive and his work ethic is real."310
This fact, however, highlights that being a good negotiator alone is
not always enough. Though Rosenhaus has often won success for
his clients, he has also failed others. Rosenhaus may not have the
"huge" successes that he has now if he worked more collaboratively
and more ethically, but he would more effectively represent all of
his clients instead of just a select group. Agents like Rosenhaus
should be harnessed with ethical rules specific to sports in order to
better protect all athletes and not just the best of the best. Other-
wise, when agents participate in deceptive tactics, such as
Rosenhaus's ploy with Willis McGahee, this approach "leaves too
many clubs feeling vanquished rather than gratified, which is not
the way an equal partner in negotiation should feel."3 1' For some
305. See id. at 137 (discussing what responsibilities agents should have).
306. See King, supra note 260 (explaining inability of young athletes to make
their own decisions or choose agent correctly).
307. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 5, at 28 (listing all of the tasks which
one agent has performed for their clients, many of which are management ori-
ented; some of tasks are following: handling rape case, helping client move, etc.).
308. See Burwell, supra note 244 (calling Rosenhaus "the most hated man in
football," nickname given to Rosenhaus by Sports Illustrated); Maske, supra note 237
(stating that other agents accuse Rosenhaus of stealing their clients).
309. See Brown, supra note 236 (discussing allegations brought against
Rosenhaus).
310. Id. (discussing his view on Rosenhaus).
311. Crasnick, supra note 63 (discussing results that may occur because of ag-
gressive negotiation styles).
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team executives in the NFL, hearing that Rosenhaus is a player's
agent may cause a collective groan and negative impression. 312
It is undeniable that both Drew Rosenhaus and Ronald Sha-
piro have been incredibly successful in their respective roles as NFL
and MLB agent.3 13 It would seem, however, that the Shapiro
method of negotiation is a more welcome and sustainable one, as it
emphasizes the importance of long-term relationships and mutual-
ity in contracts.3 14 This has been proven by the large number of
MLB teams that seem to have no hesitation in negotiating with Sha-
piro because of his reputation. 315 While hiring Rosenhaus as an
agent may not be an absolute deterrent to dealing with a player,
some teams may hesitate when deciding whether or not to enter
contract negotiations with "The Shark."
Negotiation is based on relationships. 3 16 Agents who pursue
contracts that have the potential to lead to other contracts yield a
larger return-on-effort.3 17 Nonetheless, many negotiators approach
a contract as a one-time deal; "Go in, score, get out."3 18 Shapiro
believes the most effective negotiating comes when you help the
other side to achieve at least some of what they want.319 This helps
build relationships that can lead to an infinite number of future
deals. 320 Consequently, although Rosenhaus has made millions
with his negotiating techniques so far, his position at the top of his
game may start to slip if his relationships with teams have been
soured. 321
312. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 236 (stating that Rosenhaus' relationship with
players such asjavon Walker and Terrell Owens has created tension between play-
ers and teammates).
313. See Brown, supra note 236 (stating that Rosenhaus represents more N.F.L
players than any other agent).
314. See generally Shapiro & Jankowsky, supra note 187.
315. See Barker, supra note 189 (describing how MLB umpires called on Sha-
piro to help them deal with union leaders).
316. See Shapiro &Jankowsky, supra note 187, at 229 (explaining that building
relationships is necessary for superior negotiating).
317. See id.
318. See id. at 230 (explaining what negotiation style does not lead to good
long term results).
319. See id. at 230-31 (discussing what works in negotiating).
320. See id. at 231 (discussing what may result by using property negotiating
technique).
321. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 274 (showing anger Rosenhaus' be-
havior caused New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and Colorado Rockies); see also
Burwell, supra note 244 (describing how Tampa Bay Buccaneers fined Rosenhaus'
client, Errict Rhett $465,000 for 93 day hold-out).
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Players and owners generally agree that there is a problem in
the player representation business.322 "Lack of competence, client
stealing, and overly aggressive negotiating tactics are all common
.... [E]veryone, including players, heads of the players associa-
tions, and even many agents, universally agrees that such behavior
is a problem."323 NFL Hall of Fame player Kellen Winslow Sr. said
that anyone paying a three percent commission to his agent is be-
ing ripped off: "They have decided [to sign with an agent] because
agents have sold them a bag of goods of what they can do for
them."3 24 This should remain as a word of caution to professional
athletes to remain smart when deciding on their representation.3 25
While acting as an agent, like anything else, is a business, agents
need to remember that they are hired as a fiduciary and as an advo-
cate for their clients.326
In the growing era of "show me the money," it would be wise
for athletes to hire an attorney to help them maximize their poten-
tial earnings. However, this attorney cannot be just any attorney.
He must be a well educated, well trained and ethical, and most im-
portantly, he must seek to promote his client and not himself. As
the late attorney-agent Mark McCormack - founder of IMG and the
representative for Jack Nicklaus, Gary Player, Greg Norman, and
Annika Sorenstam, among many others - once said: "The client is
the story, not the agent .... We make money by helping the client
make money. The second you become more important than the
client you represent is the moment you need to get out of this
business."3 27
322. See Karcher, supra note 74, at 739 (introducing current problems in
player representation business).
323. Id.
324. Liz Mullen, Winslow Sr. 's Advice: Don't Sign Quickly, Don't Pay 3% Negotia-
tion Fee, SPORTS Bus. J., (Jan. 19, 2004) (explaining views of certain professional
athletes).
325. See Kessler, supra note 285 (listing reasons why choosing representation
is difficult but important).
326. See Couch, supra note 60, at 137 (describing fiduciary duty of agent to
"advance his client's interest").
327. Betsy Nagelson McCormack & Steve Eubanks, Golfs Ultimate CEO: Mark
McCormack was the World's First Super-Agent, and His Methods Stand Up Today, GOLF
DIGEST, Oct. 2006, at 35 (explaining role of agents).
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